Page 105 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, et al.,) Washington State) Supreme Court Case Plaintiffs,) No. 102174-7) King County vs.) Superior Court Case JULIE WISE, et ano., $$\rm No.\ 21\text{-}2\text{-}12603\text{-}7}$ KNT Defendants. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS VOL. 3 Monday, June 5, 2023 Transcribed from Audio Recording HEARD BEFORE: THE HONORABLE LEROY MCCULLOUGH MALENG REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 401 Fourth Avenue North Kent, Washington 98032

TRANSCRIBED BY: DOUGLAS ARMSTRONG, RPR
Washington CCR No. 3444

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1	(Recording begins at 3:01 p.m.)
2	
3	THE BAILIFF: Court is now in session, the
4	Honorable LeRoy McCullough presiding.
5	THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated.
6	Good afternoon.
7	Let me have the moving party on the case, the
8	plaintiff, identify herself and identify the cause
9	number for the record, and then I'll have the other
10	parties identify themselves.
11	ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	Virginia Shogren for Washington Election Integrity
13	Coalition United, acronym pronounced "we see you," in
14	Cause Number 21-2-12603-7 KNT. And with me at
15	plaintiff's table is Lawrence Hutt, my legal assistant.
16	THE COURT: Thank you and good afternoon.
17	All right. And other counsel, please.
18	ATTY. SUMMERS: Your Honor, Ann Summers on
19	behalf of King County defendants.
20	THE COURT: Thank you.
21	ATTY. HACKETT: David Hackett on behalf of
22	King County defendants.
23	THE COURT: Thank you.
24	ATTY. ISAACSON: And Mari Isaacson on behalf
25	of King County.

Page 109 1 THE COURT: Thank you. 2 ATTY. HYATT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Heath Hyatt on behalf of the Washington State 3 Democratic Central Committee. 5 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 6 Anything else other than the argument that we heard last week from any party before the Court makes some preliminary remarks? Ms. Shogren, anything? 8 ATTY. SHOGREN: Unless the Court would like 9 10 me to comment on the proposed orders that came in this morning, I have -- or on the Waste Systems, Inc., case 11 12 cited during oral argument on Friday? 13 THE COURT: No. That won't be necessary. I've not reviewed those orders because I haven't made a 14 15 decision yet. ATTY. SHOGREN: All right. Thank you. 16 THE COURT: And from the county, from the 17 18 respondents, is there anything else? 19 ATTY. SUMMERS: No, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. So let me begin by 21 expressing my appreciation to all counsel. Welcome to 22 all of you that are here. 23 You know that this is the opportunity for the 24 Court to give its decision on the several issues that 25 were before it, and in this situation, of course, some

people may be happier than others. That's the nature of what we do, but it's a very important matter.

I've been on the bench long enough to know that on occasion, there can be some very inappropriate exchanges between attorneys. So I want to state for the record my appreciation to all counsel for your professionalism during this very important session.

I would also like to thank the members of the public who were here last week, especially those of who you honored protocol requests.

Now, I need to tell you that some of you violated -- somebody violated the Court's orders. I asked that there not be cell phones. I asked that there not be transmissions. We did have some anyway. I found out about it afterwards, which is why we're not proceeding by Zoom because some of you or somebody -- maybe not you in the room -- ignored the Court's orders. So that's why we're here in person. That's why we're ramping up on the protocol. I asked some people not to chat back and forth because it was distracting to the lawyers. Some people continued to chat anyway. So we're here in person, and so we're going to ask you to honor what the Court is asking you to do.

assisting us with maintaining that particular protocol.

Be reminded that we are using two courtrooms, this

courtroom and then Judge Allred's, in case there are

others that want to come in and need to be seated.

By further way of preliminary remarks, I'll indicate that no cell phones are to be in the courtroom, and there's to be no unauthorized transmission. If you feel the need to use your cell phone, feel free to leave the courtroom to retrieve it. Use it outside, and we'll go from there. Having said that, let me just share that note-taking is absolutely permissible, but no video or audio recording without prior permission of this Court.

As I understand it from plaintiff's counsel's closing arguments, some of the fundamental concerns before the Court today are, in this matter: addressed concerns about vote-flipping, party preference tracking, improper certification of the 2020 voting results. And there was some concern that some of the ballots might have been bound by loose zip ties, which might have, in the minds of some people, made it easier for those ballots to be compromised.

However, let me just share with you the specific purpose today. It is to offer the Court's decision on the several issues that were presented to

the Court. One was the plaintiff's motion for the declaratory judgment. Second was the plaintiff's motion for an order to show cause. Third item was the defendants' motion for summary judgment and related requests.

And we'll note for this record that the intervenor's status was previously granted, and counsel is present. They've already identified themselves.

For those of you who weren't here, I will tell you that the oral argument was had on Friday.

Again, the arguments as well as the briefing were very professional. Thank you again for that. And today's decision will be reducing in writing -- to writing by the respective counsel. And then, when the amendments are made, it will come back to me for my signature.

Usually in these kinds of situations, the lawyers will tell you that there's a brief decision that's made. Sometimes it's five minutes; sometimes it's ten, depending on what the issues are. Today's decision is going to be a little bit longer because I believe that the topic is really important.

Historically, I will remind all of us that as of yesterday, we had an anniversary as it pertains to voting. June 4, 1919, Congress passed the 19th

Amendment, which would legally guarantee the right of

American women to vote. Of course, following that and before that, we had decades of struggle to make sure that those rights were, in fact, secured.

Before the 19th Amendment, we had the 15th

Amendment that was ratified February 3, 1870. It was a

constitutional amendment that guaranteed the right of

citizens to vote regardless of, quote, race, color, or

previous condition of servitude. Just like the 19th

Amendment, there were years of bitter struggle involved

in actualizing and securing those rights.

The concept that each qualified person should have their right to vote protected and their votes properly considered is fundamental to this American democracy. So that the significance of the issues involved here today require a little bit more time than usual, I'm going to thank you in advance for your patience as we work through this particular case.

Now, the first item that we will cover is the motion to show cause on the public records claim. The plaintiffs request an order -- and this is a quote -- "requiring the defendants, Julie Wise and King County, to permit the inspection, copying, testing, and/or photography of certain categories of public records requested by WEICU, namely original ballots, ballot images, spoiled ballots, and those ballots returned as

Page 114 undeliverable concerning the November 3, 2020, general 1 2 election." According to plaintiffs, the relief requested 3 4 is pursuant to RCW Chapter 42.56, the Public Records 5 Act, specifically RCW 42.56.550(1), which reads as follows: 6 "Upon the motion of any person having been 8 denied an opportunity to inspect or copy a public 9 record by an agency, the superior court in the county 10 in which a record is maintained may require the responsible agency to show cause why it has refused to 11 allow inspection or copying of a specific public record 12 or class of records." 13 RCW 42.56.550(1) is discretionary. It says 14 that the court "may" order certain things as opposed to 15 "shall." 16 It was undisputed in this hearing that the 17 records sought fall within the definition of a public 18 19 record, 42.56.010, parens (3) and (4). 20 I think it is undisputed further that under 21 the judicial review dictates of Chapter 42.56 RCW, that the burden of proof shall be on the agency to establish 22 23 that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that exempts or prohibits 24 25 disclosure and that said judicial review is to be

Page 115 de novo, RCW 42.56.55(1) and (3). As I understand it, 1 2 the plaintiff asserts that there is no statutory exemption for these voting records. 3 According to 42.56.550(3), courts shall 5 consider the policy of Chapter 42.56; that is, that free and open examination of public records is in the 6 public interest. Under RCW 42.56.070(1), each agency, such as 8 King County Records and Elections, "shall make 9 10 available for public inspection and copying all public records unless the record falls within the specific 11 exemptions of Subsection 8 of this section, this 12 13 chapter, or other statutes which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." 14 15 Again, the petitioner or plaintiff asserts that there is no statutory exception for election 16 records. Respondents, however, assert that the records 17 sought fall within the 42.56.070(1), quote, "other 18 19 statute" exemption from disclosure, and that's what 20 we're going to talking about. 21 Now, regarding ballots in particular, there's a section in the code, in the Revised Code of 22 23 Washington, that addresses ballots. RCW 29A.60.110(1) 24 requires that all ballots counted at a ballot-counting 25 center must be sealed immediately after their

Page 116 tabulation and be retained, quote, for at least 60 days 1 2 or according to federal law, whichever is longer. sealed containers, quote, may only be opened by the 3 canvassing board as part of the canvass, to conduct recounts, to conduct a random check under RCW 5 29A.60.170, to conduct an audit under RCW 29A.60.185, 6 or by order of the superior court in a contest or election dispute. 8 This Court finds that none of those 9 10 contingencies is present in this motion. We'll also note that the Revised Code of 11 Washington 434.261 -- I'm sorry -- 434-261-045 and 12 13 WAC 434-250-110 are provisions that amplify the processes of 29A.60.110. 14 Specifically, RCW 29A.60.125 addresses 15 ballots that are physically damaged or unreadable or 16 uncountable by the tabulating system. According to 17 that section, original and duplicate ballots must be 18 19 sealed in secure storage at all times except during 20 duplication, inspection by the canvassing board, 21 tabulation, or to conduct an audit under 29A.60.185. 22 So that's the Revised Code of Washington. 23 Let's now look at what the Constitution says of Washington State. Article 6, Section 6, Washington 24 25 State Constitution requires that the legislature,

quote, provide for such method of voting as will secure to every elector absolute secrecy in preparing and depositing his ballot, unquote.

It has been suggested that this particular provision, the protections of this provision end at the deposit of the ballot. In this Court's opinion, that is a strained construction. It cannot be an absolute secrecy if the secrecy stops at the ballot, depositing the ballot. So it is this Court's reading that in preparing the ballot and depositing the ballot, the secrecy is maintained even after it is deposited.

The issue of where the ballots are to be exempted from public records disclosure was specifically addressed by a couple of cases in this jurisdiction or covering this jurisdiction. Court of Appeals Division 1, another show-cause hearing, there was a case of White vs. Skagit County decided July 13, 2015. The White vs. Skagit County court made a couple of declarations that are relevant here.

What are some of those? One, the issue in this case is whether copies of ballots are exempt under a, quote/unquote, "other statute" delineation.

Another statement they made: An "other statute" exemption to public disclosure may be found even if it is not stated explicitly.

Third point they made: The statutory scheme controlling ballots in RCW Chapter 29A is very long and complex, and, therefore, how it expressly exempts ballots from public records disclosure cannot be found in just one quote from one statute. However, taken as a whole, RCW Chapter 29A expressly exempts election ballots from disclosures as public records.

Another point that they made in this White vs. Skagit County case: There is a constitutional mandate for, quote, absolute secrecy, unquote. They mention that ballots are exempt in their entirety, and they mention that the lack of statutory safeguards to protect the secrecy of the vote indicates the legislative -- that the legislature had no intention that ballots be subject to public disclosure. In other words, they determined in that particular case that ballots are exempt in their entirety.

The same issue was addressed by another case by our court of appeals. This is the superior court. Cases from this court go to the court of appeals, and we are bound by what the court of appeals decisions say. The same issue was addressed by Division II of the Court of Appeals' decision, July of 2017.

There, the plaintiff, White, submitted a PRA,
Public Records Act, request that Clark County produce

ballots cast in the November 2013 election. White appealed the trial court's ruling that the ballots were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of White's motion to show cause and dismissed White's Public Records Act action. This case, that is to say the Clark County case, addressed tabulated versus pretabulated ballots.

After acknowledging the requirement for liberal construction of the PRA in favor of disclosure and after recognition that the agency bears the burden of establishing that an exemption to production applies, the Division II court determined, among other things, that whether a statute is an "other statute" exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1) is a question of law that, quote, we review de novo.

They also stated that because RCW 29A.60.110, quote, is clear that tabulated ballots must remain sealed, there was no reason for the legislature to include an explicit exemption. They stated that RCW 29.60.110 requires that all ballots counted be sealed and retained.

Now, the White vs. Clark County decision also noted that RCW 29A.60.110 includes unambiguous language that the sealed containers may only be opened in four

specific situations. It is that restriction on accessing the ballots, it says, that creates the exemption.

In rejecting Plaintiff White's argument, that court ruled that administrative rule WAC 434-261-045 could provide a PRA exemption. In fact, the court stated, "And we" -- and here's a quote. "We hold that WAC 434-261-045 constitutes an express, quote, other statute, unquote, exemption for tabulated ballots and ballot images."

Regarding privacy such as would be suggested by the anonymous nature of the ballots -- and we talked about that at the very early stages of this hearing -- the court held that 29A.60.110 and Washington

Administrative Code 434-261-045 means that ballot exemptions apply to ballots in their entirety. And it says no amount of redaction will transform the ballots into some other type of record, unquote.

This state's supreme court, which is higher than the court of appeals, declined review of both White vs. Skagit County and White vs. Clark County, both of those cases. Accordingly, the White trilogy of cases is precedential and would dictate the results herein. In contrast to other cases submitted by plaintiff, these White cases specifically and pointedly

address not some other issue, but they address the issue of voter and ballot privacy.

Accordingly, the motion to show cause and to order the defendants to permit inspection of the ballots is denied. This result is mandated by consideration of Article 6, Section 6 of the Washington State Constitution; RCW 29A.60.110 requiring sealing except under circumstances; 29A.60.125; and the established precedent on these precise issues that have been considered by the State Court of Appeals, Divisions I and II.

As the petitioner's counsel accurately observed, accurately observed in its closing, the legislature passes the laws, and it's up to the courts to construe or interpret them.

Regarding the motion for declaratory

judgment -- oh, let me just indicate also there was an argument about a bill that was passed in 2023, Senate

Bill 5459. As to whether or not that was retroactive,

I do not make that conclusion. I think it

inferentially supports the conclusion that the PR A exemption includes the election records, but I am not convinced on the record that was made that that particular legislation is retroactive or that it defines the results to be followed.

Moving on to the motion for declaratory judgment. It is stated in RCW 7.24.120 that the chapter is declared to be remedial. It is not to be given for or used for advisory opinions. Its purpose is to settle and afford relief, quote, with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Consistent with this -- and other relations.

Consistent with this, the court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such, quote, would not terminate the controversy giving rise to the proceeding, unquote. I refer you to 7.24.060.

With that in mind, the petitioner's requested declaration that the tabulated Washington State ballots are anonymous public records pursuant to RCW 29A.08.161 would not, quote, terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding because the issue is whether or not the ballot records are, in fact, exempt. This is especially so in light of the White vs. Clark County pronouncement that the issue of redaction -- i.e., privacy -- is immaterial.

Tabulated ballots are exempt in their entirety from disclosure under the PRA and the cited RCW 29A.60.110. And the requested declaration does nothing to settle or afford relief with respect, as I

said, to the ultimate question, the absolute constitutional secrecy of the ballots.

Accordingly, although the Court would agree that the ballots are anonymous -- and we made that determination preliminarily -- the Court exercises its option under RCW 7.24.060 to decline to enter the requested declaratory judgment. Plaintiff's fight, if you will, unquote, or remonstration actually is with the rulings of the appellate courts of this state and/or with the legislature, and that's what needs to happen. So the motion by plaintiff for a declaratory judgment is denied. The PRA claims are accordingly dismissed.

Let me go on to something else. As a second basis for dismissal, the parties have acknowledged that there was no attorney signature for this to the complaint was that filed in this court. This Court was presented with no persuasive or controlling authority that laches applies; in other words, that by proceeding through the courts, the respondents gave up their right to claim a CR 11 violation.

The complaint filed by a corporate body must bear the signature of an attorney, and that's specifically laid out in CR 11. And to date, no such signature is attached to the complaint.

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1	Relative to that provision, there's a case
2	called Dutch Village Mall LLC vs. Pelletti,
3	P-E-L-L-E-T-I [sic], 162 Wn. App. 531, a 2011 case,
4	wherein the language appears as follows:
5	"CR 11 provides if a pleading is not signed,
6	it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
7	the omission is called to the attention of the pleader.
8	When a corporate entity presents a pleading not signed
9	by an attorney, CR 11 is a proper basis for striking
10	the pleading." And that's at page 539 of that
11	particular case.
12	The absence of the signature was called to
13	the attention of the pleader; that is to say the
14	plaintiff in this case. However, as of Friday, there
15	was no attorney signature attached to the complaint.
16	As a matter of law, the corporate entity is
17	obligated to have its legal claims presented in court
18	through a licensed attorney, and that Dutch Village
19	Mall case talks about why we need to do this. They
20	state that a major reason for prohibiting the conduct
21	of litigation by a nonlawyer is because it creates
22	burdens for everybody involved. And so they want to
23	make sure that the pleadings, the arguments, and so
24	forth are done in accord with the rules.
25	Accordingly, the defense motion to strike the

pleadings is granted, and the plaintiff's counsel's representation in court pursuing the claim that was not signed cannot alter the result dictated by Dutch Village vs. Pelletti.

The defendants have asked the Court to dismiss the case on the basis of standing. The Court is declining to do so. The defendants presented a Rhode Island case as precedent. I don't believe that that's enough for me to state that people who are concerned about voting shouldn't have the opportunity to at least bring their matters to court.

Now we go to RCW 29A.68.013. This has to do with timeliness. This says that "Any judge of the superior court in the proper county shall, by order, require any person charged with error, wrongful act, or neglect forthwith" -- that's that formal language that they love to use, "forthwith"/immediately -- "correct the error whenever it is made to appear to such judge by affidavit or an elector -- affidavit of an elector that an error" -- and this is paren (3) -- "or omission has occurred or is about to occur in the official certification of any primary or election, including a challenge to the certification of any measure.

"An affidavit of an elector under this subsection shall" -- not "may" -- "shall be filed with

the appropriate court no later than ten days following the official certification of the primary or election as provided in the relevant statutes or, in the case of a recount, ten days after the official certification."

At its core, the issue before the Court is the 2020 election. Plaintiff's claim herein was filed in 2021, more than, quote, ten days following the official certification. Based on this statute as well, the plaintiff's claim may not be considered and would be appropriately dismissed.

Let's go now, finally, to the motion for summary judgment. I told you this was going to be a long hearing, a long reading.

The respondents request that the Court dismiss the pro se plaintiffs' claims because there's been no response, no competent evidence to support the summary judgment. And I have received nothing from the petitioners, from the pro se plaintiffs. And that being the case, that would be granted.

But the summary judgment dismissal of the WEICU is going to require a little bit more conversation. The respondents have requested that the Court strike the petitioner's Exhibit D. They are saying that it was an anonymous -- by an anonymous declarant. At the hearing, I heard about why that

Page 127 1 person's signature was not there and why that person 2 might have remained anonymous. This is concerning Exhibit D. 3 4 The summary judgment proceedings are governed 5 by Civil Rule 56. A summary judgment is to be, quote, 6 rendered forthwith -- that word again, immediately --7 if the pleadings, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 8 fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 9 10 as a matter of law. Civil Rule 56(e) requires that supporting and 11 opposing affidavits shall -- not "may" or "should" --12 13 shall be made on personal knowledge and shall -- not "maybe" -- set forth such facts as would be admissible 14 in evidence. In other words, the idea is if you're 15 asking for summary judgment or if you're responding to 16 a summary judgment, what is it that would be presented 17 in trial? 18 19 And, C, the supporting and opposing 20 affidavits shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 21 competent to testify to the matters stated within that particular document. 22 23 A party adverse to the summary judgment 24 motion may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, 25 but must -- not "maybe" -- but must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

So not only must there be some issue of fact, but it
has to be a genuine issue, and it has to be material or
it needs to make a significant difference.

With the foregoing in mind, the respondents' motion, then, to strike the plaintiff's Exhibit D is granted. The submittal is not signed. The signature block is, in fact, redacted. The submittal purports to delineate the respondents' errors in certifying the 2020 election results. As such, the Exhibit D submittal fails to show that its anonymous affiant is competent to testify to the matters presented in that submittal, nor does it sufficiently show personal knowledge of the matters asserted therein, Civil Rule 56. So the State's -- the defendants' motion is granted.

Further, the plaintiff's fundamental concerns are with what they have talked to me about: vote-flipping, tracking, party preference, improper certification. To prove its concerns, the petitioner is asking this Court to order the election ballots released to it under the Public Records Act so that the plaintiff can review those things. There is nothing of record to show that the concerns about vote-flipping, party preference, and so forth would be revealed by the

1 release of the records sought.

More importantly, the dispute over the process of managing and counting the ballots does not rise to the level of a genuine issue of material fact as it pertains to the request for release of ballot records. In other words, the courts have already said -- the appellate courts have already said that the ballots are exempt from public disclosure.

That means that these, then, facts that have been presented to the Court as disputed facts are not material. They do not change the ultimate question before the Court as to whether or not there is a PRA exemption of voting records.

In addition, as we talked about the claim, the pleading is not signed by the attorney. In addition, I would note that the claims do not comply with 29A.68.013 in terms of the time that we talked about earlier.

So there is no genuine issue of material fact under CR 56(e) or CR 56(c). And the plaintiff simply must -- may not rest or rely on the pleadings themselves, but there needs to come -- they need to come forward with some proof that would be admissible as if we were in a trial.

Accordingly, the respondents' motion for

Page 130 summary judgment is granted as to all claims and 1 2 plaintiffs. Respondents' requested declaratory relief is granted per 7.24.020, 7.24.060, and 7.24.120. 3 As a matter of law, the Court is ruling that 5 the respondents may not release ballots, ballot images, 6 or voter signatures for public inspection or copying under the PRA. In contrast to the plaintiff's claim for a different declaratory relief, this Court believes 8 that the respondents' claims do terminate, 9 10 quote/unquote, the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, which is a requirement under 11 7.24.060. 12 13 And in light of the prior rulings in this case, the plaintiffs -- the respondents' request for 14 15 relief for permanent injunction is not necessary and is declined. 16 That's the Court's ruling. I will allow the 17 parties to prepare the order and/or to refer, 18 19 incorporate by reference the Court's oral rulings. 20 On the motion for summary judgment, is there 21 anything from the moving party? 22 ATTY. SUMMERS: No. Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: On the other motions, is there 24 anything from the moving party? 25 ATTY. SHOGREN: No, Your Honor.

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                         THE COURT: Thank you very much. This matter
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             is adjourned.
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                         THE BAILIFF: All rise.
                         (Recording ends at 3:40 p.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF WASHINGTON)
2	COUNTY OF KING)
4	
5	I, a Reporter and Washington Certified Court
6	Reporter, hereby certify that the foregoing
7	audio-recorded proceeding was transcribed under my
8	direction; that the transcript of the proceeding is a
9	full, true and correct transcript to the best of my
10	ability; that I am neither attorney for nor a relative
11	or employee of any of the parties to the action or any
12	attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto nor
13	financially interested in its outcome.
14	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
15	hand this 16th day of August, 2023.
16	
17	Douglas Armstrong, RPR
18	
19	Washington Certified Court Reporter No. 3444
20	License expires 11/26/2023
21	
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