IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING


TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
VOL. 2
Friday, June 2, 2023
Transcribed from Audio Recording

HEARD BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE LEROY MCCULLOUGH
MALENG REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER
401 Fourth Avenue North
Kent, Washington 98032

TRANSCRIBED BY: DOUGLAS ARMSTRONG, RPR

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(Recording begins at 10:32 a.m.)
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THE COURT: Be seated, please.
Counsel on Zoom, are you able to hear the
Court?
ATTY. SHOGREN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
ATTY. SUMMERS: Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. HYATT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Great. Then we are ready to proceed in this matter of Washington Election Integrity Coalition United vs. Wise and others. This is Judge LeRoy McCullough presiding from Courtroom 4A of the Regional Justice Center on Friday, June 22, 2023. We are proceeding primarily by way of Zoom.

I'm going to ask the respective attorneys to introduce themselves at this point, starting with the plaintiff's counsel.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Virginia Shogren, Washington Election Integrity Coalition United, acronym pronounced "we see you."

THE COURT: Thank you.
For the respondents?
ATTY. SUMMERS: Yes, Your Honor. Ann Summers appearing on behalf of Defendants Director of Elections Julie Wise and King County.

Also present at the hearing -- but I will be speaking -- are my co-counsels, David Hackett and Mari Isaacson.

THE COURT: Thank you. I see them on the screen as well.

Any other attorneys representing anyone?
ATTY. HYATT: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Heath Hyatt. I represent the intervenor defendant, Washington State Democratic Central Committee.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Hyatt, did you submit any written materials for today?

ATTY. HYATT: No, your Honor, we did not. We were granted intervention just a couple of weeks ago, and as part of our intervention, we indicated to the Court that we would not be filing responsive briefing to not upset the summary judgment proceedings.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
You may not be able to see, but there are several people here in court. Usually, we ask the gentlemen to remove their hats unless there is a religious or a health reason, but I'm not going to be "firm" firm about that. If you have to have it on, you can do that, but ordinarily, we don't have the hats on in court.

But for those of you that are on the screen,

1 there are several individuals present here in court.

Ms. Shogren, I believe you had requested that you appear in person to make the argument for your client. I'd indicated that in line with our protocol, the civil cases are typically to be on Zoom. Apparently, the word didn't get out. So we have some people that are here present, and it's okay. You're welcome, but I wanted to tell you on Zoom that we do have some people that are here in court as well. Now, those of you that are on Zoom, your images are on the screen, and the people here in the courtroom are able to see you, and presumably, they are able to hear you as well.

Anything about logistics from either attorney? All right. If not, then talk about a couple of the other protocol issues.

Just a reminder that there are to be no recordings of today's proceeding. There are to be no photographs of any of the screens. That's against the rules and against the protocol.

And the attorneys will be making the presentations in the order that $I$ will describe. It is possible that the decision will be rendered today after a brief recess. It's also possible that the Court, depending on whether or not there are any twists and

1 turns to the argument, will delay the decision until the Court has had an opportunity to further digest the presentations.

I will tell the attorneys and all of you present that there are a lot of pages that were submitted, that the Court's reviewed the materials. We have the declaratory judgment paperwork. We have the order to show cause or the motion for an order to show cause paperwork. We have the motion for summary judgment.

And all of those materials have volumes of paper, but that's okay. I want to compliment the attorneys for the concise nature of the communications, and I'm trusting that that will happen with respect to the argument as well. That's what we're going to do.

Now, the first -- here's what I would propose: first, that we receive the arguments on the declaratory judgment. And, Ms. Shogren, you are representing the plaintiffs in this case. So my proposal would be that you be allowed to go first to talk about your motion for a declaratory judgment. You will stop there, and then $I$ will hear from the respondents' argument on that point.

We'll then proceed to the second argument, which is the motion for a show-cause order. I will
receive both parties' argument on that.
The third argument will be on the summary judgment, and then we proceed from there to you, Ms. Summers, to lead the conversation there.

Any objection to that order?
ATTY. SHOGREN: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
ATTY. SUMMERS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And I think everybody here in court understands what I'm saying. If there's any questions that any of you have, ask me now because once we get started, I'll be hearing from the lawyers, and they'll being taking up most of my time.

Okay. There appear to be no questions, and so, with that -- yes?

GALLERY COMMENT: Is the -- would Your Honor be willing to hear any statements from the citizens or anybody who wishes to speak?

THE COURT: I'm afraid not. It has to be through the -- through the usual process.

GALLERY COMMENT: Thank you, sir.
THE COURT: But we are -- we welcome your presence here today.

GALLERY COMMENT: Thank you.
THE COURT: Yes?
GALLERY COMMENT: Your Honor, just for
clarification, we are not allowed to take video. Are we allowed to take audio? Is that a "no" too? THE COURT: That's a "no."

GALLERY COMMENT: Okay. Thanks.
THE COURT: You can take notes, though. GALLERY COMMENT: Got it.

THE COURT: As many handwritten notes as you want.

GALLERY COMMENT: Got it. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. With that, Ms. Shogren, let's start with you and your request for a declaratory judgment relating to RCW 29A.08, I believe. So go ahead.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor. Since the time WEICU filed its motion for declaratory judgment, King County served an admission in discovery, quote, that once returned ballots have been separated from the ballot envelopes, the voter cannot be identified, end quote. King County also conceded in its response that tabulated ballots and ballot images are anonymous once tabulated.

Based on the admission, this Court should enter the declaratory judgment as requested so that the parties can proceed with examination of now-admittedly anonymous public records in the form of tabulated

Washington State ballots.
RCW 7.24.020 provides a person "whose rights or other legal relations are affected by a statute may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."

King County continues to assert that anonymous cast ballots may not be examined because of a need to protect the secrecy of voters' ballots. King County cannot have it both ways. Either cast ballots are private and secret, or they constitute anonymous public records.

The parties are diametrically opposed in their positions, yet we now have an admission in discovery by King County that directly supports WEICU's request on this motion. Consistent with King County's admission, this Court should decree the tabulated Washington State ballots are anonymous public records as described in RCW 29A.08.161. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Summers?
ATTY. SUMMERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
King County has argued four independent bases for this Court to reject the request for a declaratory
judgment. First and most fundamentally -- and I will also be arguing this in regard to the motion for summary judgment -- the complaint as to Plaintiff WEICU has a fatal error. It was not signed by an attorney, and WEICU is a nonprofit corporation that has no right to self-representation.

Defendants cannot waive the requirement of CR 11 that a pleading be signed by an attorney or a party that has right to self-representation. There's no authority for WEICU's argument that we have waived this claim. We have brought no prior motion in this court, and we have the right to consolidate all of our arguments in a single dispositive motion for purposes of judicial economy.

Based on this fatal error in the complaint alone, WEICU's PRA cause of action or -- and motion for declaratory judgment should be dismissed.

Now, in addition, even if this Court could consider this complaint as to the PRA action, it did not request any declaratory relief on behalf of Plaintiff WEICU, and it certainly did not request relief based on RCW 29A.08.161, as required by Civil Rule 8.

Now, we have not particularly stringent pleading requirements in this state, but we do have
requirements, and one requirement is that a complaint state with specificity the relief that's requested. Declaratory relief is a specific and separate type of relief that's allowed under Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, and there's simply no basis in the complaint for them bringing this basis for relief.

Third, WEICU lacks standing to seek declaratory relief under the statute, RCW 29A.08.161, because a party can only seek declaratory relief as to a statute if they are within the zone of interests that are intended to be protected by the statute. This statute clearly protects voters' right to ballot secrecy.

WEICU is a nonprofit corporation. They are not $a$ voter. They are not within the zone of interest to be protected by this statute, and they are not someone who can seek declaratory judgment under this statute.

And, finally, based on the White cases that $I$ have detailed in length in my briefing, which come from two different divisions of the courts of appeals, in addition to recent legislative acquiescence clarifying that the legislature intended to adopt the holdings of the White cases, ballots are exempt from public disclosure.

And so the meaning of 29A.08.161 is completely irrelevant to WEICU's PRA claim and does not present a justiciable controversy for this Court. This is not -- declaring the meaning of 29A.08.161 would not provide any effective relief to Plaintiff, and for that reason, a declaratory judgment is improper. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you agree, Ms. Summers, that the votes, once tabulated, are anonymous?

ATTY. SUMMERS: Yes. Unless -- well, the only -- if someone were to, for some reason, write their name on their ballot, it would not be anonymous, but that normally does not happen.

THE COURT: The question of whether or not -once returned ballots are separated, whether or not they could be identified, is there any disagreement on that point?

ATTY. SUMMERS: No.
THE COURT: So if you agree with that, Ms. Summers, that essentially these are anonymous ballots, your argument comes down to whether or not the ultimate question -- that is to say by the cases of White vs. Skagit County, White vs. Clark County, and the others -- whether or not those cases basically resolved the issue anyway; is that right?

ATTY. SUMMERS: Yes, Your Honor.
Can I just say that people seem to be putting comments into the chat, which is distracting. I don't know if the Court wants to speak to that. It can be viewed by everyone.

Could you ask that question again? I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Let me -- let me resolve this chat issue. So even though some of you are online, you are still in a virtual courtroom. If you were in a courtroom, you would not be chatting. You would not be distracting any of the attorneys or any of the parties.

So I'm asking you to govern yourselves with that in mind. Do not use the chat in any way. If you need to talk with someone, pick up the telephone and call them, but do not invade this virtual courtroom space with your personal opinions.

So my question to you, Ms. Summers, was in light of the fact that you would agree that the votes are anonymous once they are tabulated, that takes you down to your basic argument about the White cases, that the White vs. Skagit County, White vs. Clark County, those cases basically resolve the issue in any event. Is that what you're saying?

ATTY. SUMMERS: Yes, Your Honor. Exactly.

THE COURT: The plaintiff had indicated as it pertains to $C R$ 11, the nonsigning of the complaint by an attorney, that the state or that the county had basically gone along with this all the way up to federal court and that at this point, it's very interesting, according to Ms. Shogren, that you would raise this issue. She didn't use the term "laches," but it's indicated that it's in the nature of an estoppel.

What is the county's response to that position?

ATTY. SUMMERS: Well, first of all, Your Honor, we filed a notice of removal, but this is the first motion we filed in this court.

The requirements of CR 11 are clear, should be known to everyone. And, in fact, in other cases that WEICU has filed in other counties, particularly Lincoln County, part of the basis for the Lincoln County Superior Court's dismissal was the lack of an attorney filing -- let me just check to make sure that is right -- the lack of an attorney signature on the complaint. So, I mean, they've been on notice as to this issue for a long time.

THE COURT: But nothing from you, per se?
ATTY. SUMMERS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Rebuttal, Ms. Shogren?
ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
I think it's very important for the Court to understand that none of the White cases addressed the ballot anonymity statute that we're talking about. I'm not sure why that is the case, but they did not take that statute into account. Those courts were very focused on the concerns over voter secrecy related to ballots, but they did not acknowledge the fact under the election code that the ballots are rendered anonymous by law once tabulated.

And the reason for that is when we conduct elections, we conduct public elections. So we have to publicly review the cast ballots in order to, you know, add up the votes and arrive at election results.

THE COURT: And who's the "we"? Who's the "we" that you're referring to?

ATTY. SHOGREN: The King County Elections department personnel do review each ballot in person before they are scanned into the system. That was established at the deposition of Director Wise. And then the ballots are tabulated for purposes of arriving at election results.

So the secrecy that is described in the state constitution, Article 6, Section 6, ends at the

1 depositing of a voter's ballot because past that moment, the people, the government who represents the people, must look at that ballot in order to arrive at an election result. So the election code that renders cast ballots anonymous is consistent with the state constitution and consistent with the reality of public elections.

THE COURT: Unless there's anything further on that, I am not going to resolve the White vs. Skagit County or the White vs. Clark County issue until later in the proceeding. But with the exception of that, the Court's ruling on the declaratory judgment is that the state ballots are anonymous pursuant to 29A.08.161 and related statutes.

I believe that even though there is no challenge that the pleading was not signed by an attorney, we do have to talk about whether or not that is a fatal error. And we do have to talk about, under Civil Rule 8, whether the complaint that didn't ask for a declaratory judgment is fatal.

As it pertains to that second issue, I believe that the rules would require liberal interpretation. So I will not dismiss the motion for the declaratory judgment based on Civil Rule 8. I do believe that there is an arguable position that the
plaintiffs are concerned as a group of voters, even though they're not individual voters.

So at this point, the motion for the declaratory judgment is tentatively granted, but subject to the Court's later ruling as it pertains to the applicability to the White cases.

Let's move now to the second issue, the motion to show cause. Back to you, Ms. Shogren.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you.
King County has not met its burden on the motion to show cause as to the Public Records Act claim, Cause of Action 16. Under the Public Records Act, the burden of proof shall be on the agency to establish that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that exempts or prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or records.

Despite the passage of 21 months, King County still has not cited to a single statute that exempts or prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of the specific records requested, either in the Public Records Act itself or any other statute. King County relies primarily on a ballot container statute, RCW 29A.60.110, but that statute does not exempt or prohibit disclosure, in whole or in part, any of the

1 records at issue. The ballot container statute describes circumstances in which a ballot container may be opened by the canvassing board, an entity not involved in this action.

King County next relies on Article 6, Section 6, of the Washington State Constitution, but that section does not exempt or prohibit disclosure, in whole or in part, any of the records at issue. The absolute secrecy required by Section 6 ends with the depositing of the ballot. That is because we have public elections that require public disclosure and counting of the votes on the ballots.

Public review of cast ballots is not prohibited by the constitution. King County cannot rely on a perversion of reality and the state constitution to deny examination.

King County then tries to rely on a series of case opinions, referred to as "the White opinions," which are not a statute that prohibits or exempts disclosure. Case opinion is not a statute.

The White opinions never address RCW 29A.08.161, the ballot anonymity statute rendering tabulated ballots anonymous by law. The White courts were concerned about violating voter secrecy or privacy, but there can be no secrecy or privacy

1 concerns for records that are legally required to be anonymous because they are reviewed as part of a public election.

King County then tries to rely on Title 29A, the entire election code as a whole. The entire election code is not a statute that exempts or prohibits disclosure. The entire election code includes the ballot anonymity statute, which renders cast ballots anonymous public records.

Implied exemptions, which is what happened in the White cases, are not allowed under the Public Records Act. One of the White cases has been sharply criticized by that reason by a commenter in the Washington State Bar Association's Public Records Act Deskbook.

Finally, King County wants to rely on a recent senate bill that it publicly supported, even though to do so was inconsistent with 21 months' worth of removals, denials, sanctions, threats, motions for sanctions, counterclaims, and claims of frivolous litigation. Senate Bill 5459 is not retroactive to requests from September 2021 and only confirms that no statutory exemption existed until May of 2023 for two categories of records requested by WEICU.

SB 5459 does not prohibit disclosure of any

1 of the requested records. It does not affect the Lyft

4 Act, RCW 42.56.540. other privacy concerns. presented. precedent? factors required to be met before records may be prohibited from examination under the Public Records

King County has not met its burden on this motion to show cause as to any of the four categories of records at issue. Under the Public Records Act, since no exemption exists, King County must be ordered to permit inspection of the records. There is no choice under the law. Thank you.

THE COURT: Before $I$ hear from the county, you sort of dismissed the cases, White versus the two counties. As I read the cases, Ms. Shogren, they actually looked at what they call the interplay of 29A, all the statutes. They looked at the interplay of the statutes with the state constitution and some of the

And those cases seem to suggest that when you look at all of the -- all of that, there is something, even though it's not a specific statutory exemption. There is an exception that's been created by the universe of statutes and other kinds of things that are

Do you believe that those two cases are

ATTY. SHOGREN: No, Your Honor, I do not. THE COURT: Why are they not precedent?

ATTY. SHOGREN: The White cases, first of all, fail to take into account the ballot anonymity statute. They did not address the fact under law, election code law, that ballots are anonymous once they're cast and tabulated.

Those cases also did not prohibit the examination of any of the records that WEICU is looking at. The court -- the courts in the White cases did not examine the Lyft factors from the Lyft vs. City of Seattle, Washington State Supreme Court case from 2018, and so they do not prohibit the examination of any of the records.

THE COURT: And let me interrupt you. The Lyft cases had to do with what? What was the subject matter?

ATTY. SHOGREN: It was trade secrets and whether or not they could be prohibited from examination. And what the Supreme Court --

THE COURT: So if we're talking about trade secrets, is that in some way very different from a person's ballot?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Actually, the ballots, since they are anonymous by law, it's -- there is no grounds

1 to exempt them or prohibit them. Trade secrets have even a higher level of secrecy attached to them, whereas anonymous cast ballots should have zero secrecy connotations attached to them.

The big-picture issue with the White cases is that the courts stepped in and found an implied exemption based on a Gestalt approach, and that is specifically not allowed under Washington State Supreme Court law. The case of Doe vs. Washington State Patrol makes it very clear that the courts' role is not to create exemptions, no matter how much they might want to under some Gestalt approach.

There either has -- there either is a statute that exempts or not. It's a black-and-white situation. It's not a gray area where courts can step in and say, "Well, you know, there's all these rules about how ballots have to be secured, and this information has to be locked away, and this has to be stored in a certain way. So we're just going to assume that the legislature wants to exempt these."

That's not how it works, and that's why the Washington Bar Association Deskbook on the Public Records Act, the commenter's section which we've provided to the Court basically says anyone who approaches the use of implied exemptions to the Public

Records Act should proceed with extreme caution. And the commenter basically said those cases are somewhat overruled by post Washington Supreme Court decisions like Doe vs. Washington State Patrol that make it extremely clear that courts just cannot go there.

THE COURT: And I'll come back to you in a second after $I$ hear from the -- from the state then on this issue, but the final question for now is whether or not either of the White cases were submitted for review to the Washington State Supreme Court. And if, so what was the result?

ATTY. SHOGREN: I'm not sure, but I believe review was denied, at least as to one of them.

THE COURT: All right. We'll come back to you.

Let me hear from you, Ms. Summers.
ATTY. SUMMERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
Well, first of all, we have the same argument as to the CR 11. Again, seeking any relief based on a complaint that has a fatal error is inappropriate.

But getting to the substance of the public records claim, there's no evidence of any violation of the Public Records Act here. King County provided the adjudication records that were requested. There's no dispute as to that. King County offered to redact and

1 scan ballot envelopes. That offer was declined.
2 There's no factual dispute as to that.
King County also offered to produce ballot envelopes for physical inspection. That offer was received, but no response was received from the requester, and the request was closed. Again, there's no dispute as to that. So that just leaves us to the ballots themselves and the ballot images.

There are three White cases, two from Division 2 and one from Division 1. Two of them were from 2015. One was from 2017. Review was sought in all three of them, and the Supreme Court denied review in all three cases.

More importantly, the legislature, although it made amendments to the Public Records Act, never did anything that indicated its disagreement with the White court's interpretation of the statutes surrounding election records.

And then, just recently, in 2023, the legislature passed a clarifying amendment to the PRA. It is explicitly clarifying in that in Section 1 of Senate Bill 5459, they state their legislative intent. First, they note that requests for records containing voter registration information, election data have increased exponentially over the past several years,
and that they're passing this legislation intending to, quote, clarify responsibilities for producing records.

When the legislature explicitly passes a clarifying amendment, it is retroactive. It is intended to indicate its agreement with prior case law, which is exactly what the legislature did.

So there can really be no question that the legislature agreed with the holdings of the White cases as well as that the Supreme Court agreed with the holding of the White cases by denying review. And the holding of the White cases and now the new legislation adopting those holdings make clear that ballots and images of ballots are not subject to public disclosure. Imagine if anyone could demand to take custody of all the original ballots and all the ballot images from an election, and the county simply had to hand them over to the first requester with no controls over what might happen to those ballots. That would clearly violate both state law and federal law, state law that requires secure storage of the ballots, and that is explicitly at 29A.60.100. This says the tabulated ballots must be kept in sealed containers and can only be opened for specific purposes such as recounts, random checks authorized by statute, or conduct an audit that's authorized by statute. And, of

1 course, federal law and the Civil Rights Act of 1960 requires us to retain all those records for at least -for 22 months, should there be any federal investigations under the Civil Rights Act. So there's just no support in Washington law that the first requester can demand custody of all the ballots from an election.

As the White cases found, the White cases didn't create a common-law exemption to the Public Records Act. The White cases examined all the election statutes and the statutory scheme and found that, as you say, the interplay between them indicated a legislative intent to exempt ballots from public inspection.

And that is entirely consistent with the Public Records Act. It is entirely consistent. It is interpretation of the statutes which is the role of the courts, and particularly the appellate courts.

As to -- so as the White cases found, the entire statutory scheme evidences an intent to make only certain election records available to the public and to maintain security of other records, particularly ballots, which are the most important election records that we have. And those are due to very compelling state interests in both election security and election
finality.

The White cases are dispositive, as is the recent legislation, which indicates, finally, explicitly what was indicated implicitly before, was the legislature acquiescence in the holding of the White cases.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Let me round back to you, Mr. Hyatt, to give you a chance to respond to both issues.

And then, Ms. Shogren, when I come back to you, you'll have the opportunity to respond to Mr. Hyatt's comments as well.

ATTY. HYATT: Thank you, Your Honor.
The intervenor defendants join in the arguments made by King County and have nothing further on the two issues that the Court has already discussed, but with Your Honor's indulgence, we would appreciate being heard briefly on the third issue that you would like to address in this hearing.

THE COURT: And that is the summary judgment? ATTY. HYATT: That's right. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.
So back to you, Ms. Shogren.
ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you.

I am intrigued by King County's position that the legislature passing law this year somehow clarifying court cases automatically renders it retroactive. I am not familiar with that concept, and I do not think that that is an accurate statement at all.

Last year, the legislature did pass a statute amending the Public Records Act to exempt certain election-related information, and in that statute, they expressly said that it was -- it applied to any requests that were still outstanding as of a certain date. So it was retro -- it had retroactivity back to a certain date, whereas the SB 5459 does not have any such language in it.

And what the Court really needs to understand is that the SB 5459 does not prohibit examination of any records. There's a difference between exemptions and prohibitions under the Public Records Act. Exemptions happen at the agency level. Then, if brought up to court and the agency still wants to prohibit examination, it's incumbent upon the agency to file a motion to prohibit examination under the Public Records Act.

And that's where the Lyft case comes into play as well. The Lyft case, the Supreme Court, in

1 2018, which postdates all of the White cases and the review-denieds on the White cases, said that if an agency wants to prohibit examination, even of exempted records, it's incumbent on the agency to bring the motion under RCW 42.56 .540 so that the -- so that the judicial branch can undergo an analysis of whether the records -- of whether release of the records would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage a person or vital governmental functions.

So that is not happening here. And according to the Lyft decision, Supreme Court 2018, that has to happen before an agency can block access to records. Setting aside all the exemptions, you have to look at the prohibition issue. So, again, that's -- those are the factors, the Lyft factors that the Court has to consider before it can prohibit examination.

King County is requesting a permanent injunction against WEICU from ever looking at ballot records. And in order for the Court to decide that, it must determine the Lyft factors.

Conveniently, King County has not brought those issues to the Court's attention, probably because those factors are very high. The standards are high and very difficult to meet in a case where you're

1 looking to review anonymous records. These are 2 anonymous records.

The Public Records Act was passed by initiative 50 years ago for a reason, and this is the reason. The public has to be allowed to look at its own public records to make sure that the government is conducting elections in a free and equal manner, which is guaranteed by the state constitution. If they cannot review their own anonymous records, then they cannot confirm that their rights are being upheld. So thank you.

THE COURT: By having --
ATTY. SUMMERS: Your Honor -- Your Honor -oh, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Just a second.
ATTY. SUMMERS: I have additional authority for the retroactivity of clarifying amendments, if

1 you'd like it.

THE COURT: I'll come back to you in a minute.

With respect to the public being a wild beast and so forth, you both have been very good about not going -- including polemics. I appreciate that.

Is it possible that -- Ms. Shogren, that the review of these ballots has been entrusted legislatively to a particular agency and/or individual? And is that -- is it possible that that's the check and balance that the legislature had in mind? Is that at all?

ATTY. SHOGREN: I don't think we can speculate as to what the legislature has decided. I think it comes down to the public right to review public records.

And we can't step in and say, "Oh, you know, that might be embarrassing to somebody." The Public Records Act specifically says that embarrassment is not a grounds to withhold records.

THE COURT: It does say that.
ATTY. SHOGREN: So all of this -- it does say that. You cannot withhold -- you cannot withhold records just because it might cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials.

THE COURT: But let me interrupt you. That's a -- that's a different question.

The question is if the legislature had in mind that they wanted to have some checks and balances here, did the legislature have an opportunity to specify how those checks and balances would be put in place? And if so, is it possible that the current scheme is that legislature's view of what the checks and balances are?

ATTY. SHOGREN: The checks and balances are in the Public Records Act already.

THE COURT: Okay.
ATTY. SHOGREN: That's the -- that's our law. Now, it was passed by the people. It wasn't passed by the legislature, but as far as priority of legislation, I think it would be fair to argue that the Public Records Act preempts the state legislature acts on that point.

If we don't have access as a society to our own anonymous public records, then what is the point of the Public Records Act? That is the check and balance right there. The check and balance is that the people have the right, the inherent right to review their own records to ensure that the government is acting in their best interests.

If we violate the Public Records Act, where are we? We are left with nothing. We have no rights. We have no ability to look at anonymous records, and we are left in chaos.

THE COURT: Okay.
ATTY. SHOGREN: We need to be able to look at our public records. That's what the people dictated 50 years ago, whether the current legislature wants to exempt certain records.

The current legislature wants to carve out -you know, carve up the Public Records Act until it's, you know, so full of Swiss holes -- Swiss cheese holes you can't, you know, get anything. But right now, what we have is nonretroactive exemptions for two of the four categories. That's it.

And the exemptions, even assuming the exemptions apply to two of the four categories, that doesn't prohibit examination. The Public Records Act requires the Court to undergo the Lyft factor analysis before even exempt records can be prohibited from examination.

There is such a high bar, Your Honor, under

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the --
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THE COURT: I get it.
ATTY. SHOGREN: -- Public Records Act.

THE COURT: Let me -- let me ask --
ATTY. SHOGREN: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: Let me ask you a different question going back to the $C R$ 11. We kind of $--I$ kind of glossed over it. Concerning the claim not being signed by an attorney for a corporate body, one case that was referenced by the county was Dutch Village vs. Pelletti, 162 Wn. App.

What about that notion, Ms. Shogren, that a corporate body cannot represent itself, but that it has to be represented by an attorney? Could I have your input on that?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Sure, Your Honor.
This is a PRA -- this complaint includes a PRA cause of action, Public Records Act cause of action, and WEICU was the requester for that request. So it is, statutorily, a proper party to have brought the complaint.

And King County is fully aware that WEICU retained counsel at both the federal and state levels, and it had no objection to WEICU signing the complaint when it removed the action to federal court, a court of limited jurisdiction in October '21. King County asserted no CR 11 or signature objections as an affirmative defense --

THE COURT: Did you ever --
ATTY. SHOGREN: -- either in federal --
THE COURT: Hold on for a minute. Did you ever sign the complaint? Did you ever sign it?

ATTY. SHOGREN: No, Your Honor. I stepped in as counsel for WEICU at the federal level. The federal court --

THE COURT: And --
ATTY. SHOGREN: -- gave WEICU --
THE COURT: Hold on.
ATTY. SHOGREN: -- a certain amount of --
THE COURT: Hold on. So has any attorney
ever signed the complaint, yes or no?
ATTY. SHOGREN: No, Your Honor. I have appeared on behalf of my client.

THE COURT: If no --
ATTY. SHOGREN: And the -THE COURT: If no attorney has signed the complaint, under the case of Dutch Village vs. Pelletti and some of the other cases -- I think it's Pelletti. I can't even. Under the -- under that case law and under Civil Rule 11, what more specific response do you have to the county's position that that's a fatal error?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Well, Your Honor, at the
federal level, the federal court gave WEICU a certain amount of time to retain counsel. The federal court did not dismiss the action or threaten to dismiss the action, only if it did not retain counsel within a certain amount of time.

So WEICU did retain counsel, and there's been no objections to my appearance at the federal level or the state level. There was no affirmative defense raised by King County regarding no attorney signature. King County filed a Rule 11 motion in federal court against all the parties, had no objection.

So by any standards, concerns regarding lack of corporate representation were rendered moot when WEICU retained counsel at both the federal and state levels. King County answered the complaint. King County asserted affirmative defenses, which did not include a claim of no attorney signature.

King County also filed counterclaims against WEICU on the Public Records Act cause of action. How do you file a counterclaim against a party and then turn around and claim, "Oh, that party should have been, you know, represented earlier by counsel"?

You just -- there's got to be a point where there's an estoppel, and I think we've -- we're past that point in this case. We're 21 months into this
case, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I appreciate that.
Back to you, Ms. Summers.
ATTY. SUMMERS: Yes. Your Honor, the case I would like to bring to your attention is Washington Waste Systems vs. Clark County, 115 Wn .2 d 74. And I can provide this by email if you would like.

THE COURT: Yes.
ATTY. SUMMERS: That case held --
THE COURT: Please do. Send it by email to everyone, to Ms. Shogren as well as to the Court.

ATTY. SUMMERS: I will.
That case held that curative statutes which clarify older legislation without changing prior case law presumably apply retroactivity. That's exactly what happened here. The legislature passed a law that was consistent with prior case law, explicitly stating it was intending to clarify the duties under the Public Records Act.

And that -- but it doesn't -- you know, the new law doesn't have to apply retroactivity, Your Honor, because the White cases had already interpreted the statutes and held that the Public Records Act exempted ballots from -- so that's a little bit of a red herring. But I do think it's important for the

1 Court to realize that this was a clarifying amendment that indicates legislative acquiescence, and were it important, it would be applying retroactively.

You know, Ms. Shogren talks about the public's rights, but, you know, once WEICU would take custody of all the original ballots and ballot images, then no one else would have the opportunity to see those. So, you know, that's -- it goes to my argument that the idea that a single requester can get custody of all these vital election records to do whatever they want with them to the exclusion of everyone else, including elected officials and federal officials, is just ridiculous. That's not what the Public Records Act was intended to do.

And I think this Court, based on your questions, you're exactly right. The entire legislative scheme is a legislature trying to balance election security and election finality with election transparency. And through their election scheme, they have specifically indicated where there are opportunities for public observation and public examination.

For example, the public has the right to see the list of voters who were given ballots and voters who returned ballots. The voter -- the public has the

1 right to come watch the processing. The public has the right to watch the canvassing; in fact, it's live-streamed on the internet. There are lots of opportunities for public inspection of the election process that the legislature has explicitly provided for, but that doesn't mean everything in the election process is open to public view because it can't be for purposes of election security.

And the legislature has made that balancing. It is the legislature's job to create that balancing and to create legislation, and it's clear that the legislature has never intended for original ballots or ballot images to be subject to public disclosure and handed over to the first requester.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Anything else from you, Ms. Shogren? The person bringing the motion typically has the last comment. So do you have a one-minute comment on this show-cause issue before we go to the summary judgment?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Yes.
In response to Ms. Summers, the retroactivity issue, she's trying to argue that SB 5459 is retroactive. Even assuming that it were, the issue that King County has is they have not moved the Court to prohibit examination under the Public Records Act.

They're talking exemptions, and what the Court needs to do is focus on prohibitions. There could be 50 exemptions to records, but the Court is the last say in whether or not examination is prohibited. And they have not brought a motion to prohibit examination under the Public Records Act, so this Court cannot act on any request to prohibit examination.

As to the arguments of, you know, oh, it would be just so much of a hassle, and, you know, what if more than one person wants to see it, the way I read those arguments is that these records are so important that they don't want the public to see them, and yet they get to see them, and they get to store them. So it's really unclear to me. If someone wants to look at records that are anonymous by law from an election that was certified 21 months ago or, you know, many, many months ago, what is the governmental interest that they are trying to protect?

And that brings us, again, to the Lyft factors. King County is trying to do an end run around the Public Records Act, confusing the Court into thinking that exemptions are the end of the story. They are not. We have to look at two major factors before the records can be prohibited from examination, and they're ignoring those factors because the

1 standards are so high. So thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. We're at 11:30, almost. Thank you so much for the direct presentations and for indulging the Court's questions.

We proceed now to Item 3 on the agenda, the motion for summary judgment. Ms. Summers?

ATTY. SUMMERS: All right, Your Honor. Thank you.

This case is unusual in several respects, but there's one particular way in which $I$ want to stress at the outset here. It's that the pro se plaintiffs' causes of action are wholly separate from WEICU's cause of action. The pro se plaintiffs causes of action involve claims related to the administration of the November 2020 general election. WEICU -- who, based on the evidence which I presented from their website, appears to have recruited these pro se plaintiffs -has not joined in those causes of action, but brings a wholly separate single PRA cause of action.

Now, King County has not moved to sever the plaintiffs, WEICU and the pro se plaintiffs, because we feel it's important for the Court to view this lawsuit in its full context. But $I$ think it's also important to stress that Ms. Shogren only represents WEICU, and WEICU only has a PRA cause of action.

So King County would object in advance to any arguments that she tries to advance today that go beyond the PRA cause of action. And I would rely on our briefing for the motion to strike both arguments made by Ms. Shogren in her briefing and evidence presented by her that go beyond the PRA cause of action and appear to be presented on behalf of the pro se plaintiffs, who Ms. Shogren does not represent.

Now, I was going to -- I'm going to address the pro se causes of action first. The state is arguing four bases for dismissal, all of which are independent and sufficient in and of themselves.

The first, as all of the courts, both federal and state, that have dismissed the other lawsuits that were filed against other counties by pro se plaintiffs recruited by WEICU have concluded, that those plaintiffs lack standing. These voter -- these plaintiffs are no different than any other voter in King County, and there's plenty of election cases that say a voter has to allege a particularized injury to have standing that sets them apart from any other voter. So standing is the first basis for dismissal.

The second basis for dismissal is they have failed to comply with the election contest statute that they purport to be proceeding under, which is

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RCW 29A.68.013. That requires that an election contest that's alleging misconduct or error be supported by an affidavit based on personal knowledge that details what election result is being challenged and why, and no such affidavits were presented in this case.

Moreover, that statute requires that such a contest be filed within ten days. And the other courts that $I$ just mentioned have also found that the plaintiffs' causes of action in the other cases were untimely under the statute.

Even without the statutory time bar, the doctrine of laches should apply. Laches is an equitable doctrine that courts especially apply in election cases due to the need to resolve election disputes very expeditiously, primarily so that elected officials can take office and carry on the business on government. Laches have barred lawsuits that are brought just one month after election was certified. This lawsuit was brought 11 months after certification, and laches is clearly a doctrine that should apply in this case.

Third, plaintiffs have -- pro se plaintiffs have submitted no evidence that supports any of their claims. They cannot rely on allegations in the complaint. Even those are based on information belief

1 and didn't allege any specific facts to support their claims of misconduct. This is not $a \operatorname{lb}(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ motion. This is a CR 56 motion, and it requires the plaintiff to show that they have evidence to support their claims, which has not been done here; in fact, the pro se plaintiffs have presented nothing to this Court.

And, finally, to the extent that the pro se plaintiffs request declaratory relief, there's no justiciable controversy here as to the -- as to the conduct of the November 2020 general election. The entire matter is moot. This Court can grant no effective relief. The requirements of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be met here.

Turning to the separate, wholly separate WEICU Public Records Act cause of action, I don't want to waste the Court's time. I think we've pretty much argued that to the extent with the prior motions. Again, we're relying on the fatal error in $C R 11$. They've had plenty of time to fix it. This -- we have not waived it.

You know, parties can make alternative arguments, and this is an alternative argument. And we presented all our arguments for dismissal in a single dispositive motion to this Court. We did not waive it by prior motions. So -- and there's no authority that
$1 \quad C R$-- the requirements of $C R 11$ can be waived.

As to one other thing $I$ want to talk about is the difference between an exemption applying and an agency actively seeking injunctive relief from a court, which is what, you know, happened here. Due to the importance of election security, King County -- King County took the extra step to seek actually declaratory and injunctive relief from this Court. It's in our counterclaims. We cite to the relevant PRA statute.

I don't know what Ms. Shogren's talking about, about how we haven't brought a motion for an injunction. We clearly have. It was in our counterclaims. We've argued it in our briefing. We asked this Court to declare what the court of appeals and the legislature has already declared, and the language is in our proposed order, but it's essentially that the defendants cannot, as a matter of law, release ballots or ballot images for public inspection.

Now, if a party -- now, if an exemption applies, an exemption applies, and an agency can rely on the exemption. If the agency wants to take the extra step to seek injunctive relief from a court, then the Lyft factors come in, and that is that the agency has to show that disclosure is not in the public interest and would damage a vital governmental
function.
I think that's easy to show here. We've argued it. I mean, the White courts and the legislature have essentially already made that determination, that releasing ballots to the public is not in the public interest and would damage a vital governmental function, most importantly protecting election records, to protect election security, and also to provide election finality.

As I said, I feel like we've already kind of covered this ground. So I don't want to waste the Court's time, but I would be happy to entertain any questions.

THE COURT: Thank you.
We'll go to you, Mr. Hyatt.
ATTY. HYATT: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be brief.

The intervenor defendants will join King County's arguments as well, but $I$ just wanted to emphasize one of the points that Ms. Summers made, and that is that the context here does matter. This is -this lawsuit is an election contest, plain and simple. The plaintiffs can dress it up. They can style it however they want, but the result is clear, and what they're seeking is clear: to discredit, decertify, and
throw out the November 2020 general election results.
They are time-barred from doing so. It's very clear what the procedure is to challenge the election. It's laid out in statute. They have not followed that procedure, and it has long passed the opportunity for them to challenge the November 2020 election, Your Honor.

This is virtually the same case and the same lawsuit that has been brought repeatedly in Superior Courts across Washington State. And it's the same type of arguments and allegations being made across the country, all of which have been routinely rejected.

The context here matters, Your Honor. The point of this lawsuit and the arguments being made today are to overturn the 2020 general election.

Aside from the statutory issues, Your Honor, the plaintiffs and WEICU lack standing. This case is clearly moot. The results have been certified. The people who have been elected are now serving.

And, finally, Your Honor, the doctrine of laches clearly controls and should apply here. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Shogren?
ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll just start by noting that I've heard intervenor defendant say they're joining in the arguments of King County defendants, and I'm sure the Court has noted that the coplaintiffs filed a joinder to join in the summary judgment motion opposition, which I will now proceed to provide.

This action was jointly brought in 2021 by individual plaintiffs and a nonprofit to resolve election procedural irregularities in the 2020 general election and to fix those problems for future elections. The statutory claims address misconduct by the director in using an uncertified voting system; documented vote-flipping, additions, and deletions; illegal party preference tracking; and ballot security issues involving the use of loose zip ties on ballot containers. The Public Records Act request was initiated by the nonprofit, WEICU, and seeks records relevant to the other causes of action incorporated by reference into the PRA claim.

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that the there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

King County defendants filed a CR 56 motion that reads more like a Civil Rule 12 motion. King County has missed the boat. Summary judgment may be granted only if there is no genuine issue of material fact.

The parties in this matter are far apart, to put it mildly. It's as if the parties are in separate universes with separate realities. One side says Director Wise used a federally uncertified system, based on Election Assistance Commission publicly available information and a whistleblower declaration. Director Wise testified that all she needs to worry about is whether the system is certified at the state level.

One side documented massive vote swings and vote-flipping in the official results for the election and submitted a declaration outlining the evidence. Director Wise testified at her deposition that that never happened.

One side has shown voters' party preference is being tracked in authenticated ballot reports, contrary to election law. Director Wise testified that party preference is only being tracked for a short period of time, so it's okay.

One side says ballot security was compromised

1 because zip ties on container lids are being left
2 loose, facilitating easy removal for stuffing the evidence in support of its own complaint.

King County has its head buried deep in the sand. At the same time, it wants to assert a narrative that is not subject to judicial notice; for example, the November 2020 general election was, according to experts, the most secure, verified, and transparent election in American history. King County didn't identify any expert witnesses in its primary witness disclosure who could support this.

Or this one: The coordinated efforts to flood the courts throughout the nation with these frivolous claims against election officials has constituted an unprecedented assault on American democracy. Is WEICU responsible for suits in other states?

And then there's this one: The only purpose of plaintiffs' audit would be to fundraise and spread misinformation about the November 2020 election.

If Director Wise is so worried about misinformation, why -- why has she blocked access to over 2.4 million public records since September 2021? She testified that she was the one who made that decision, and yet here we are, 21 months later, patiently waiting for her to provide one shred of evidence to corroborate her version of the facts. Instead of providing the public records,

1 Director Wise has been working overtime to get
2 legislation passed this year to keep ballots and ballot
3 images behind her personal locked doors. She also

6 years. statutes, as shown in the Lyft decision. The Washington Supreme Court made it clear in the Lyft case from 2018 that the provisions of the PRA which are statutory preempt the civil rules. So where the Public Records Act has standards for prohibiting examination

1 of records, they have to be followed.

The Court must apply the Lyft factors if the government wants to prohibit the public from reviewing its own anonymous cast ballot records. And as explained in the Lyft decision, to prohibit disclosure, this Court would have to find that examination of the records would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage a person or vital governmental functions.

King County has not moved to prohibit examination, probably because those standards are very high. So what are they doing instead? They asked the legislature to exempt some of the records, but Senate Bill 5459 is not retroactive, does not prohibit examination, and does not affect the Lyft factors under the PRA for prohibiting examination.

In their reply brief, King County cites to First Student for the proposition that legislative action in regard to a statute without repudiating a prior court interpretation of that statute is evidence of legislative acquiescence, except that's not what the case says. It says, quote, when an agency adopts a WAC interpreting a statute, repeated reenactment of the statute without repudiating the interpretation in the WAC is evidence of legislative acquiescence, though it

1 was only a factor to be considered, end quote.

This concept that King County's clinging to, that the legislature has acquiesced to the judicial branch when it comes to ballot review, completely ignores the Public Records Act as a whole. The legislature passes the laws, and the judicial branch construes the laws consistent with our state constitution. The judicial branch does not enact laws, nor does it enact statutory exemptions or prohibitions under the Public Records Act.

Prohibition against the people's right to examine anonymous records would contravene multiple provisions of the Washington State Constitution. The legislature presumably knew that when it didn't go so far as to prohibit examination in Senate Bill 5459. And King County presumably knows this, so it filed a CR 56 motion that leads to Court to think an agency's finding of an exemption is an end of the story under the Public Records Act, which it is not.

King County's motion for summary judgment is legally untenable any which way you look at it and must be denied. If the Court sees a need for any additional briefing on any issues, WEICU would be more than happy to provide it. Thank you.

THE COURT: You indicate, Ms. Shogren, that
there's several different genuine issues of material fact. I made a note. You said there was some evidence of vote-flipping, party preference tracking, loose zip ties, and that the method used was uncertified by federal standards. Did I hear you correctly?

ATTY. SHOGREN: That is correct. That's a good summation, Your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: The response or, I should say, the county's position, of course, is that under Civil Rule 56, you can't just state that. You need to have some admissible evidence by way of declaration or otherwise under 56(e).

Do you have that information?
ATTY. SHOGREN: Yes, Your Honor. We submitted evidence in support of our opposition. My declaration has multiple exhibits to it. I can direct the Court's attention to Exhibit D, for example.

THE COURT: All right. I --
ATTY. SHOGREN: The declaration of --
THE COURT: I'm at Exhibit D, declaration of $M-A-R-A-S$.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Correct. Exhibit 3 to Ms. Wise's deposition. Ms. Maras is an intelligence agency contractor who implemented election operations, both in the continental U.S. and outside the

1 continental U.S. for the Obama administration. And her declaration details the lack of federal accreditation by the voting system test laboratories assigned to certify the systems used and Pro V\&V being one of those testing laboratories. Their accreditation expired February 24, 2017. So at the time Pro V\&V was certifying the Clear Ballot system used by King County in 2020, it was no longer accredited.

Ms. Maras goes into the details of why that's so important. The testing laboratories are tasked by federal law with making sure that the systems cannot be unduly manipulated, in particular, making sure that the hardware used in electronic systems cannot be easily accessed. And so Ms. Maras goes through excruciating detail. She -- you know, as a whistleblower, she took great personal risk in issuing this declaration, but she did it. So we have it. It explains how it's done in United States and in other countries.

She also explains the fact that -- she goes through the detail of the algorithms that are set within the voting systems with predetermined results and how the evidence from 2020 showed that there were massive swings within the voting -- course of the votes been shown over time. Sorry. It's not the right word, but -- and that is indicative of an algorithm being
used. And that would be consistent with what WEICU was seeing in the official records for the 2020 general election.

She also, interestingly, says that as part of these operations, the people on the ground have to make sure that the ballot records, the paper records, somewhat comport with the electronic records. So when there's changes, unexpected changes have to be made, then people on the ground are handling the ballot side.

And that ties into, potentially, the loose zip tie issue with King County containers. The level of opening of those containers is at least -- I don't know if everyone can see that -- about two and a half inches, easily accessible by a hand to reach in and remove ballots or to insert ballots into the chain of custody stream at King County.

So that is one example of evidence. Another example would be --

THE COURT: That's fine.
And this is material to the question of whether or not the ballots should be open to you because of what now?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Exactly. That they --
THE COURT: It has to be -- so that some of the nonlawyers will understand, you need more than just

1 a genuine issue of material -- a genuine issue of fact or a dispute. It has to be material. It has to make a difference.

So talk to me about why that's material, using the illustration you just gave.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you.
It's material as to the element under the statute of whether an election official -- in this case, the director -- engaged in a wrongful act or neglect as it -- as it relates to elections.

So the director has a duty to provide secure elections. She is the one who certifies. She goes under oath and certifies the accuracy of the elections.

So the question is whether she engaged in error, a wrongful act, or a neglect by allowing, for example, the containers of ballots to have very loose tops on them so that ballots could be inserted or removed at will during the chain of custody prior to tabulation. So it goes to the elements of the misconduct under the statute.

THE COURT: Anything else?
ATTY. SHOGREN: Well, I could just explain the relevancy of the records to the causes of action, which might help the public as well.

Under Cause of Action 4, if the paper -- if
the paper records do not match the ballot images or the electronic records, that would indicate use of an uncertified system. Again, according to Ms. Maras' declaration, the uncertified systems have trapdoors in them that allow for electronic manipulation of the results. So we want to be able to --

THE COURT: And how do you know -- how do you know, assuming that's the case, that the manipulation cuts one way or the other?

ATTY. SHOGREN: That's not our concern, Your Honor. We're trying to just ensure that the election is conducted properly. We're not trying to look at any -- yeah. That's not within our purview.

So for --
THE COURT: All right.
ATTY. SHOGREN: -- cause of action --
THE COURT: Go ahead.
ATTY. SHOGREN: Okay. All right. For cause of --

THE COURT: I need to -- I need to finish this up so $I$ can let you go.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Okay.
THE COURT: But make your last point quickly.
ATTY. SHOGREN: Okay. Cause of Action 7, review of ballots and ballot images will help corroborate the vote-flipping and deletions documented by WEICU.

Cause of Action 10, if excess spoiled ballots exhibit votes for particular candidates, that would indicate tracking of ballots by party preference.

And Cause of Action 13, if official vote totals contradict the records, that could be the result of the removal or addition of ballots out of the containers. So thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Back to the moving party. And let me go to you, Mr. Hyatt, very quickly, if you have anything before I give Ms. Summers the last comment.

ATTY. HYATT: Yes, Your Honor. I think your question about material facts was the absolute right question to ask, and what Ms. Shogren did not address was how there are any material facts about the defenses and arguments being raised. There may be some material facts about the claims that she's asserting, but not the defenses being raised.

There's no dispute of material facts that they have failed to contest the election pursuant to the statute, no material facts regarding the equitable defense of laches, no dispute of material facts over mootness, no dispute of material facts over standing.

So everything should be dismissed pursuant to CR 56 that the plaintiffs bring in this lawsuit. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Ms. Summers?

ATTY. SUMMERS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be quick, and I appreciate your careful attention this morning and to the briefing.

It is not ethical for Ms. Shogren to be presenting argument or evidence on behalf of plaintiffs that she has assiduously avoided representing, but under CR 56(e), an adverse party to a summary judgment must support their claims with affidavits based on personal knowledge. There is no evidence presented by any person with personal knowledge of anything that happened in King County.

This Maras -- purported Maras affidavit, I -the copy I had had the name of the declarant redacted out in the signature. So I don't think we know who that's from. Just because Ms. Shogren says it's this person, Maras, doesn't make it so. It's certainly not obvious. It's certainly not presented on the face of the document.

THE COURT: Let me --
ATTY. SUMMERS: Moreover, that document -THE COURT: Let me stop you there.

Ms. Shogren, my copy shows that the name at the end is redacted as well -- Shogren. What does that mean?

ATTY. SHOGREN: I believe it's because she is a federal contractor, and her name was redacted. I have been in touch with her counsel and have been given express permission to use the declaration for all purposes in this lawsuit.

THE COURT: All right.
And I see some chats here. I've asked you not to do that because we're in a virtual courtroom. Maybe someone logged on later, but the rule is do not use the chat to be sending notices to anybody or distracting the attorneys. If you feel you can't obey that, you can feel free to disconnect.

Back to you, Ms. Summers.
ATTY. SUMMERS: Thank you.
I stand by my point that an anonymous declaration is not competent evidence. Moreover, that declaration has nothing to do with Washington State, let alone King County, nor does the other declaration have anything to do with any -- there's no evidence from any person with personal knowledge as to any irregularities that occurred in King County in the November 2020 election.

The November 2020 election was properly certified long ago. The results are final. There is no legislate purpose for this action. The Court -- we ask that the Court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismiss all of the causes of action, and, if the Court sees fit, to grant our request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
So we're very close to the noon hour. I've been privileged to receive the arguments from all of the attorneys. Thank you so much. I am not going to try to render a decision in three minutes.

What I would propose is that the bailiff contact the respective parties to see if the parties would be available to be online for a decision the first part of next week. I do have some -- a few items I want to go back and review based on what I've heard here today.

Is there a day next week that the attorneys are not available? We're not available Tuesday and Wednesday, so either Monday or -- maybe Monday afternoon.

ATTY. SHOGREN: I'm available Monday afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. SUMMERS: I am not available Monday,

1 and I'm not available Tuesday, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I couldn't hear what you said about Tuesday.

ATTY. SUMMERS: I am not available Tuesday, but the Court already said that you were not available.

THE COURT: Tuesday and Wednesday would not be -- we would not be working.

So, Mr. Hackett, are you available on Monday afternoon?

ATTY. HACKETT: I am -- I am checking, Your Honor. Just trying to get the right calendar up. And yes, as long as it is not between 1:30 and 3:00. I can try and get those meetings moved if I need to, however.

THE COURT: So you're available after 3:00.
Mr. Hyatt, are you available --
ATTY. HYATT: Yes.
THE COURT: -- Monday afternoon after 3:00?
ATTY. HYATT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So if you'll hold 3:00 p.m. as a tentative, staff will confirm that with you.

We're going to recess here now with my thanks to all of the attorneys and all of the participants. Those of you that need more information, leave your information, your contact information with Madam

1 Bailiff, and we will take it from there.

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Thank you. That will conclude the matter for today. Monday, 3:00.

ATTY. HYATT: Thank you, Your Honor.
ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
ATTY. HACKETT: Thank you, Your Honor.
ATTY. SUMMERS: Thank you.
(Recording ends at 12:00 p.m.)

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STATE OF WASHINGTON ) COUNTY OF KING
() hand this 16 th day of August, 2023.

CERTIFICATE

I, a Reporter and Washington Certified Court Reporter, hereby certify that the foregoing audio-recorded proceeding was transcribed under my direction; that the transcript of the proceeding is a full, true and correct transcript to the best of my ability; that I am neither attorney for nor a relative or employee of any of the parties to the action or any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto nor financially interested in its outcome.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

Douglas Armstrong, RPR

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