IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING


TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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HEARD BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE LEROY MCCULLOUGH MALENG REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 401 Fourth Avenue North Kent, Washington 98032

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|  |  | Page 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | I N D E X |  |
| 2 |  | Page |
| 3 | Motion to Intervene Begins | 4 |
| 4 | Court Adjourns | 36 |
| 5 | Reporter Certificate | 37 |
| 6 |  |  |
| 7 |  |  |
| 8 |  |  |
| 9 |  |  |
| 10 |  |  |
| 11 |  |  |
| 12 |  |  |
| 13 |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |
| 16 |  |  |
| 17 |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |
| 19 |  |  |
| 20 |  |  |
| 21 |  |  |
| 22 |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |
| SEATTLE DEPOSITION REPORTERS, LLC |  |  |

Page 4
(Recording begins at 1:40 p.m.)

THE COURT: Thank you very much, all parties, for your patience. Good afternoon.

Doing an audio check. Can you hear me?
Raise your hand if you can. Great. Thank you so much. And all of you can unmute at this point.

The case before us this afternoon is for a motion to intervene. The case is Washington Election Integrity Coalition United vs. Wise and others. This is Cause Number 21-2-12603-7 KNT, Judge McCullough presiding from Courtroom 4A of the Regional Justice Center. Courtroom doors are open. The parties are appearing by Zoom.

So let me have the parties introduce themselves for this record we are recording. So the plaintiff, please.

ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Virginia Shogren for Washington Election Integrity Coalition United, acronym pronounced "we see you."

THE COURT: Thank you.
The current defendant/respondent?
ATTY. HACKETT: Yes. David Hackett appearing as a special deputy representing the King County defendants. And I do not anticipate saying anything as
we have not taken a written position on the motion.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Representing the proposed intervenor?
ATTY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: Good afternoon, Your
Honor. Reina Almon-Griffin for the Washington State Democratic Central Committee.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.
So the Court's had an opportunity to review the principal materials. I want to thank you for the volume of material. I will not tell you that I have read every single case that you have submitted, but they are there for my reference, and I do appreciate that.

Let me also thank the respective counsel who have submitted briefing for your concise briefing. As we talked about in the last hearing, because the materials are so voluminous, we are emphasizing brevity, and we're emphasizing adherence to the word limits in the court rules.

So with that, I am going to start with the moving party to address the question before the Court. I believe that you should be able to finish, since I've read your materials, your arguments in 10 to 15 minutes or less. If you need more time than that, let me know, but I'm expecting us to be able to finish this with
your having 10 to 15 minutes per side.
All right. Ms. Almon-Griffin, with that in mind, if you can proceed.

ATTY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: Thank you, Your Honor. And that absolutely works for us.

The committee represents Democratic voters and candidates across Washington. During the 2020 general election, Washington's Democratic candidates won elections across the state, including here in King County. Nearly a year after the election, Plaintiff WEICU and several pro se plaintiffs filed this lawsuit here in King County and identical ones in seven other counties, alleging that a wide range of election misconduct occurred during Washington's 2020 election.

The committee moves to intervene to defend against these baseless allegations, which are designed to shake public confidence in 2020 election victories. The committee easily meets the standard for intervention articulated in CR 24(a), providing the committee an absolute right of intervention in this matter.

In the seven other identical matters, the only court to rule on the committee's motion to intervene on the merits, which was Lincoln County Superior Court, agreed that the committee was entitled
to intervene as a right. The committee has just as much, if not more, of a right to intervene here to protect its candidates' victories across the state and specifically in King County, where Democrats won nearly every race in 2020.

I plan to touch very briefly on the CR 24 (a) factors today, but, of course, I'm happy to answer Your Honor's questions. So please feel free to interrupt me anytime.

The committee easily meets the first two 24(a) factors, which are related. The first factor asks whether the committee has an interest in this matter, and the second asks whether disposition of this matter could impair the committee's interests. I'll address both factors at once since they're related. Washington courts construe intervenors' interests broadly. The interest requirement is met if an intervenor could either gain or lose by possible judgment, and when in doubt, Washington courts grant intervention. The committee undoubtedly has an interest here because possible judgment in this case would directly impact the committee.

Plaintiff asks -- Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the county committed election fraud by creating a record of party preference; participating in
adding, flipping, and removing some unidentified portion of hundreds of thousands of votes across the state during the 2020 election; and participating in party preference between voters during the 2020 election. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to allow them to fish for evidence to support these baseless claims through an audit of the county's election department and by inspecting King County 2020 election ballots.

If this Court were to grant Plaintiffs' requests for relief, and we don't think that it should, that would directly impact the committee. This lawsuit is an opaque attempt to alter Washington certified election results, which includes seats won by the committee's candidates.

While WEICU protests that the complaint doesn't specifically use the word "election fraud" and doesn't explicitly ask to decertify the 2020 election, that argument is irreconcilable with the breathtaking relief that they have requested and with the allegations that they have made. And for the reasons that we will likely discuss further at the June 2nd hearing on the merits, their aversion to calling this lawsuit an election contest or making it look like an election contest is merely an attempt to avoid Washington's clear statutory deadlines to file election contests.

Plaintiffs' allegation that hundreds of thousands of votes were flipped during the 2020 election alone targets the election's outcome and implies a statewide conspiracy. An order declaring that hundreds of thousands of votes were flipped by election officials would almost certainly call into question the 2020 election results and would have far-reaching impacts on Democratic candidates' victories and reputations across the state.

And while WEICU claims that it would not under any circumstance seek to decertify the 2020 election, the pro se plaintiffs have not said the same, and they've not said anything at all on this matter so far. WEICU can only speak to the single claim that it has brought, which is the PRA claim. The allegations about vote-flipping and party preference are related to the constitutional claims, which have been brought by the pro se plaintiffs.

At a minimum, plaintiffs seek to legitimize misinformation through this lawsuit in an attempt to undermine public confidence in the legitimacy of Washington Democratic candidates' 2020 victories. Many of the committee's candidates elected during 2020 may soon be running again for office in 2024. Nearly a
full election cycle later, plaintiffs are still suggesting, without any support, that widespread election misconduct occurred in 2020 and that those candidates did not legitimately win their seats. The committee has a clear vested interest in this matter and meets the first two CR $24(a)$ factors.

The third CR 24(a) factor is also met. The third factor asks whether the county will adequately represent the committee's interests, and it cannot. Under Washington law, an intervenor need only make a minimal showing that its interests may not adequately be represented.

Contrary to WEICU's assertion, Washington law
does not require that an intervenor's interests be in conflict with that of the existing parties.

Intervention is allowed where the intervenor's interests differ than those of the existing parties and where interests may not adequately be addressed or articulated.

The committee's interests differ from the county's interests. They are broader. While the county may have an interest in ensuring that King County's election results are upheld, the county does not share the committee's interests in defending Democratic candidates' victories and reputations
against Plaintiffs' baseless allegations. Because the committee's and the county's interests diverge, the county cannot adequately represent the committee's interests.

And, finally, the fourth factor asks whether the committee's application is timely. In Washington, intervention is timely unless it would work a hardship on one of the original parties. And in general, in Washington, a motion to intervene is timely when made prior to trial, and this case is not set for trial until October.

The WSDCC promptly intervened in this case when it was filed back in September of 2021. It again sought to intervene in the federal matter, but that ultimately was remanded to this Court. And it again promptly seeks to intervene here, well before trial is set in October.

And the committee's intervention will not work any hardship. Although the committee noted in its motion to intervene that it intended to file its proposed motion to dismiss if it was granted intervention, rather than disturb the briefing schedule that is currently set for the June 2 nd hearing, the committee will not file its motion to dismiss prior to the June 2nd hearing.

We would instead reserve our right to file it at a later date if this matter is not dismissed after the June 2nd hearing. And we would ask Your Honor for the opportunity to be heard at the June 2 nd hearing and would only address arguments raised in the parties' briefing.

In the event that the Court does not find that intervention as a right is warranted, we would ask the Court to exercise its discretion to grant the committee permissive intervention. For that, the committee simply needs timely intervention, which it has done here, and it also needs to have a defense with a common question of law. Here the committee's defense shares a common question of whether Plaintiffs have a valid cause of action. The committee's motion is timely, it has defenses that are common, and intervention would not result in any prejudice.

As a final note, Your Honor, in the wake of the 2020 election, when there was an unprecedented attack on this country's election process, Democratic entities were routinely granted intervention in those election cases alongside state and local election officials. For the reasons discussed and explained in our briefing, we request the Court to do the same here in this action.

THE COURT: Anything further at this time?
ATtY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: No, Your Honor, nothing further.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Let me ask you. I read in the plaintiffs' -one of Plaintiffs' documents that the motion to intervene had been made and denied, and my impression, Ms. Shogren, was that you were talking about a district court. I'm not -- U.S. District Court. I'm not sure.

But, Ms. Almon-Griffin, what happened in U.S. District Court? Was the question of your motion to intervene addressed at all?

ATTY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: Thank you, Your Honor, for asking for that clarification.

The court, the U.S. District Court, did not address our motion to intervene on the merits whatsoever. This case was remanded, and the motion to intervene was simply denied as moot because this case was being remanded.

THE COURT: Finally for now, the case of Michael Bost, B-O-S-T, vs. Illinois State Board of Elections out of the North District of Illinois, the district court there, did you have any comments as to the applicability of that case to the case at bar?

Atty. ALMON-GRIFFIN: Yes, Your Honor.

There's a couple of important distinctions between that case and the case here.

First of all, Bost is a federal case, and it applied the federal intervention standard. The federal intervention standard varies across jurisdictions, but Washington's standard on intervention is very clear that it is applied liberally. So they were applying a different standard, and that's important.

But, second, Bost was a case about a statute governing the time for counting ballots, and there the court determined that the Democratic entity that was attempting to intervene had a narrower set of interests than the county's interest. In other words, the county had all of the same interests as the Democratic entities, plus even more interests, the court actually determined.

There, in that case, there was a very different set of interests at stake, and there was not the interest of the Democratic candidates' reputations, like there is here in an election contest.

THE COURT: Anything else -- thank you -about the county then covering some of the same issues that you would cover were you allowed to intervene? Anything else about that?

ATTY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: Nothing else, Your

Honor.
I would just reiterate that even where interests overlap, Washington courts still allow intervention. There simply just needs to be the possibility that some of our interests may not be adequately addressed or articulated, and as soon as we identify interests that differ, that intervention standard is met. And we have different and broader interests here, although there may be some overlap.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Before I go to Ms. Shogren, then,
Mr. Hackett, I know you said you probably wouldn't have anything to say, but because you're representing the county, I am going to give you the opportunity to comment, if you would like to, on what Ms. Almon-Griffin has covered before I hear from Ms. Shogren.

ATTY. HACKETT: Your Honor, I appreciate the opportunity, and I have no comments to make. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
And, Ms. Shogren, if I could hear from you now.

ATTY. SHOGREN: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

This renewed intervention request does not meet the standards under Rule 24 as a matter of either right or permission. The Democrat party has filed briefs and now made oral argument oozing with political interests it seeks to protect. It wants to try and transform this case into an election contest, which it is expressly not, and bring politics into a legal matter.

If the party does not like the implications of this lawsuit, that is not WEICU's problem, nor is it the Court's problem to solve. If the party is so intent on wanting to influence the Court, it should apply for amicus curiae status. WEICU won't stand in the way of amicus curiae status if the Democrat party really wants to publicly explain the Democratic values behind its undying passion for hiding public records.

But intervention as a defendant is not the correct remedy, especially here where the party concedes that the statutes at issue, such as the Public Records Act, are, quote, wholly irrelevant, end quote.

The party says the only relevant question is whether it has an interest in this matter, and the only possible relevant interest, according to the party's declarations, is to protect the reputations of its candidates. This is because it is impossible for the

Democrat party to be defending the outcome of the 2020 general election. That election was certified years ago. There is no legal mechanism to decertify that election at this very late date.

So the only possible interest we can be talking about is the reputation of candidates from a finished election or possibly the reputations of theoretical future candidates in future elections. There are no candidates named in the lawsuit, and the party hasn't identified any candidates it's worried about in any of its multiple motions to intervene filed in many other suits cited in its briefing.

Intervention is not proper to protect the reputations of unidentified past candidates or theoretical future ones. The party tries to say that it, itself, has political prospects, but, of course, the party isn't a candidate.

The Public Records Act also makes it clear that embarrassment is not a reason to deny records requests. The act underscores the free and open policy behind examination, quote, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others, end quote.

So, Your Honor, if we take the 40,000-foot view of what's going on, we have a global law firm
representing a political party, attempting to block access to over 2.4 million public records. That same political party is asserting that review of those records will somehow upend election results from a closed election.

The request to intervene is based on what is tantamount to an admission against interest. The Democrat party is saying, "Please let us into this case so we can get it dismissed because if the requested records are examined under the Public Records Act, we lose." An example of that position can be found in the supplemental reply, page 4, lines 7 through 10, where the party asserts that this matter threatens Washington Democrat candidates' 2020 election victories.

There is no basis for intervention by a political party where there is no legal mechanism to upend any election results. The plaintiffs are not requesting a change in any election results. There are no named candidates involved in the action, and state law policy promotes the review of public records, notwithstanding the embarrassment or other inconvenience to public officials or anyone else.

So this Court's position for all the right reasons under Rule 24 should be to deny intervention in this instance while leaving the door open for amicus
curiae status. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.
Let me ask you. The representation to this Court has been that you, as the plaintiff, have claimed a couple of things, directly or indirectly. So I'll have you respond to these things: potential fraud; allegations of vote-flipping; party preference machinations, for lack of a better word; and that you want an audit to inspect the ballots.

But in your argument, it sounds like you are suggesting that you -- it's matter -- it's a matter of accessing the public records and almost nothing more and nothing less.

Can you clarify for purposes of this motion what it is the plaintiff is, in fact, asking for?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
The statutory election process claims are brought under RCW 29A.68.013, Subsection 1 and 2. And under those claims, the plaintiffs are asking whether the electronic voting system that was used in 2020 was legally certified; how and why the official results showed massive swings in vote totals, sometimes downwards, which should never legitimately happen; and why ballot containers were left loose enough to allow ballots to be inserted or removed prior to tabulation.

The statutory claims bring these election process irregularities, AKA wrongful acts -- that's the phrase that's used in the statute, not the word "fraud." The word "fraud" does not appear in the body of the statute, only in the heading, which is not part of the statute.

So the statutory claims bring these process irregularities to the attention of the Superior Court so that the election officer can be instructed to correct the errors going forward. The legislature specifically granted the judicial branch oversight over the acts and conduct of election officials under RCW 29A.68.013. And, again, the claims are under Subsection 1 and 2 of that statute, not Subsection 3, which seeks decertification.

And as it relates -- oh, sorry. Go ahead.
THE COURT: Ultimately, then, what is -- what are you looking to accomplish? Is it just an answer on what happened with these things? Are you asking that you have access to information such as who voted which way? Are you asking for the Court to declare anything -- that anything was amiss relative to the 2020 election? Kind of tell me what this means. Even if you get what you want in Sections 29A.68.103(1) and (2), what is it, ultimately, that you would be asking
the Court to do?
ATtY. SHOGREN: The Court can examine what happened at the -- at the election level, and if it finds that there were irregularities, problems with the process, it can direct the election officials to fix those problems going forward. That is the oversight that the judicial branch has been granted with respect to our elections.

So WEICU and individual plaintiffs are asking this Court to review specific problems that they have evidence of from the 2020 election and to determine how those problems can be fixed with directions to the election officials -- namely Julie Wise, who's the director of elections -- for future elections.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.
And as it pertains, finally, to the federal case of Bost and some of the others, is there something that you want to say about the standards that those cases have suggested that we follow?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Yes, Your Honor. Again, the scope of the interest has been a subject of discussion, and the Democrat party here in this case is saying that their interests are different, are broader than King County's interests.

So King County has an interest in running
election processes correctly with respect to its elections, like you certify systems. The Democrat party is trying to set itself apart from that to say, oh, it represents Democrat voters, which, of course, King County is concerned about, but we also have these candidates out there, and they might -- they may -they're almost saying -- they're saying as if they're going to be forced out of office or something horrible's going to happen if we start looking at the records, the public records which tie into the process irregularities.

So, for example, if an uncertified system was used, you would want to look at the records to see. Do the paper records match the electronic records? If they don't, that might suggest use of an uncertified system. And we do have evidence from whistleblowers saying that that is a problem, that the current systems use COTS, commercial office shelf components, so that they're easily manipulated. But the records will help us determine exactly what happened with the other causes of action.

And, again, the interest of the Democrat party here is outside the scope of the complaint. It's outside the scope of any remedy requested in the complaint. It's outside the scope of any remedy that
could be granted by the Court.
This Court has no power whatsoever to decertify the 2020 general election, but this Court does have the legislatively mandated power to review election processes when the evidence is bought to it by the public, which is exactly what's happening here.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.
Mr. Hackett, I am going to note for the
record that $I$ saw your body language, and you were shaking your head one way or the other as if you might just have something to add. If you did, I'm going to give you that chance now before I go back to Ms. Almon-Griffin.

ATTY. HACKETT: Your Honor, you are perceptive, and/or perhaps I don't have much of a poker face.

But in either event, Ms. Shogren has one client, and that is WEICU, and they have raised a single cause of action, which is the Public Records Act. All of the other actions that are in the complaint are raised by pro se plaintiffs, two of whom are left, who have not showed up or opposed this motion to intervene.

The representation by Ms. Shogren on what the complaint says greatly underplays the scope and the
breadth and the tremendous reach of the complaint, which has, $I$ think, roughly ten different causes of action, including damages under 1983 declaratory judgment, as well as supposed causes of action under 29A.68.013, Sections 1 or 2.

I would urge the Court to review the filed complaint, which Ms. Shogren does not sign; in fact, no lawyer has signed this complaint ever for WEICU, which really puts the Court in a -- in a -- in a position where WEICU isn't even before the Court because it has no attorney that has ever signed its complaint in accordance with Rule 11. But that will be coming up as part of the panoply of issues that will come before the Court in early June on the scheduled motions.

But I think, in fairness, the complaint broadly attacks the 2020 election, and it has a PRA cause of action raised by WEICU, supposedly through its nonlawyer director, Tamborine Borrelli.

So I leave the question of whether intervention should be allowed as a right or as a permission to the Court, but I did want to correct the record as to the limits of Ms. Shogren's representation before this Court and the breadth to the complaint that is before this Court.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I understood your
distinction between what Ms. Shogren's clients are asking for versus the pro se plaintiffs. More information on that, please.

ATTY. HACKETT: Yes. Ms. Shogren has one client, and that is the corporation, WEICU. And that corporation raises a single PRA claim, and that is it.

Everything else that is raised in the complaint about the nature of the 2020 election is -or supposed irregularities in that election, you know, supposed ability to add or subtract ballots due to loose zip ties, those are all raised by pro se plaintiffs, who are not in this hearing for reasons of their own choice and who have not filed any opposition in the intervention motion.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Shogren, before I give the final word to the person who brought the motion, Ms. Almon-Griffin, did you have any brief additional comment?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Sure, Your Honor. Thank you. The PRA cause of action incorporates by reference all the allegations of the complaint, and it's very clear in the complaint that the records sought are -- you know, they're being examined to confirm or deny the allegations of the other causes of action in the complaint. They are relevant.

And another issue under the PRA is penalties. If King County's been withholding the records in bad faith as it relates to the process irregularities that have been alleged in a verified complaint by the -- by the pro se plaintiffs -- so they have spoken, despite the assertions to the contrary -- that the -- that the other causes of action would be relevant to the penalties phase of this case as well.

So for multiple reasons -- oh, and I'll just
add King County has never severed the PRA claim from the complaint. They've treated the complaint as one document. They've sought Rule 11 sanctions against all of us in a -- in a -- in one motion. They're bringing one motion for summary judgment as to the entire complaint.

So this desire to, like, pick and choose, you know, who's representing who and -- it doesn't comport with King County's conduct over the course of the last year and a half in the litigation.

THE COURT: Am I hearing you to say, then, that the pro se members of the plaintiff group, that their claims in some way are integrated into/synthesized into the complaint?

ATTY. SHOGREN: Yes, Your Honor. It is one complaint.

THE COURT: All right. With that, then, Ms. Almon-Griffin, your rebuttal?

Atty. ALMON-GRIFFIN: Your Honor, Mr. Hackett has addressed many of the points that I was going to. Regardless of whether this is one complaint or not, Mr. Hackett is absolutely right that Ms. Shogren is downplaying the widespread allegations that are a part of all the same actions and is overselling exactly what her authority is to speak to the pro se plaintiffs' desires in this case.

While they have said that they did not plan to seek to decertify this election back in September of 2021 when they filed the complaint, they've not made the same representations that WEICU has that they will never do so.

And the allegations that $I$ listed for the Court earlier about there being hundreds of thousands of votes that were flipped across the state, some of which by the King County auditor, and that the King County director participated in party preference, those are all direct quotes from the complaint. So to characterize this as simply a PRA claim to investigate, to look at ballots, and figure out exactly what happened is just not accurate.

They asked the Court to declare that all of
these things that we've listed about unsecure ballots and hundreds of thousands of votes being flipped -they asked the Court to declare that those things happened. This is a very broad attack on the 2020 election.

THE COURT: Anything else?
ATTY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: No, Your Honor, nothing else.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Anything else from anyone?
ATTY. HACKETT: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
ATTY. SHOGREN: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Again, let me thank all of you for your presence here today, for your concise arguments, for the briefing that's Court's received. Restating what I said at the beginning, I love having briefs that are quick, short, and to the point. And as we proceed in the future, just keep that in mind. So far, you've done well. I appreciate it. Keep it up.

The court rule that's in issue here is court rule -- Civil Rule 24. As plaintiff has noted in sharing the Bost vs. Illinois case, some of those other cases are instructive in terms of just comparing how the Court might analyze the issue before the Court.

And I've looked at those. I do see that there is, of course, a difference in the standards between federal Rule 24 , the analysis on the federal track, versus the Civil Rule 24 and the state cases that govern Civil Rule 24.

In terms of what the claims are that will determine whether or not the intervenor motion needs to be granted, even though there is a statement that there is no request that the election results be undone at this late stage, it still would appear to me that the claim appears to include -- that the complaint appears to include such things as allegations of potential vote-flipping, fraud, and some other kinds of things, which, in one way or the other, would impact different parties' interests in this case. And I have to go there with the claim because if we don't know exactly what the claim is asking for, we don't know whether or not the response to the claim needs to be handled by only one party or if it's appropriate for someone else to intervene.

So the second thing that we look at, then, having determined that the claim is very broad, is broader than the Public Records Act -- and I appreciate Ms. Shogren's candor in that regard -- $24(a)$ talks about the intervention of right.

There is no challenge to the timeliness of the application. I did not hear any challenge to the moving party's statement that the federal court did not dismiss the motion to intervene on any kind of substantive basis. It was denied apparently because it was concerned moot when the case was sent back to state court.

Ms. Shogren, I did not hear any challenge to that. Do you agree with that, or is there something else I need to know?

ATtY. SHOGREN: Yes. It was denied as moot. It wasn't mooted. It was denied as moot, so --

THE COURT: All right. So they --
ATTY. SHOGREN: -- I agree with that statement.

THE COURT: All right. So they didn't get to the substance.

The timeliness, then, that's the first portion or the first component of Civil Rule $24(a)$. No question as to the timeliness. That's a general kind of a criterion. And when people -- according to the case law, sometimes you can intervene as late as before the verdict and so forth, and so there's no challenge to the timeliness.

The rule says "Upon timely application," it
says "anyone" -- and that includes the moving party in this case, the Washington State Democratic Central Committee -- "shall be permitted to intervene." "Shall" is not discretionary. So it shall be permitted to intervene in an action under two different circumstances. Paragraph 1 doesn't apply.

Paragraph $24(a)(2)$ does apply, and that says "When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the person is so situated that the disposition of the action may be -- may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect that specified interest, unless the applicant's interest is already adequately represented by existing parties."

So the first thing on this record that I'm going to do is define what $I$ believe to be the claimed interests. From my reading of the materials and the argument today, those interests include -- and this is to be broadly construed, of course -- protecting the integrity of the elected candidates.

Even though the argument is made that there is no request to undo the election, it is not clear to me if that's what the pro se representatives want to do or not. But even if they don't, there is an interest
in protecting the candidates that have been elected. There's an interest in protecting the reputations of candidates and of officeholders. There's in interest in protecting future successes at the ballot box.

There's an interest to protect the rights of voters in stating or in concluding that their proper votes were properly considered. There's an interest in protecting the credibility of a process that resulted in these results that at least the pro se representatives have some concerns about. And it was stated today that there's some interest in how the people who might want to run again might be impacted. So this is an interest that relates to the transaction which is the subject of the action.

The next portion of the rule says "and the person is so situated that the disposition may impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest." I think that that's very clear from this situation, that the Democratic committee is so positioned to protect those interests if, in fact, some of the reputations of the pro se representatives, in fact, are able to show -- were able to show that some of the ballot irregularities presented themselves, which have been suggested. That would certainly cast a pall on the persons who are in office.

It was stated at the beginning of the arguments today that the King County Democrats won nearly every election. I don't know what that means, but certainly, if they did, the disposition of this case would certainly impair or in some way impede the ability to protect these interests.

Standing is not required, as was suggested by the Bost case. Again, that's the federal case.

The question, then, back to Civil Rule $24(a)$, the intervention of right, is whether the applicant's interest is adequately represented by the existing parties; that is to say King County. The case law suggests that we have to look at what the main point is or the main function is of the parties, and so the question framed differently concerning whether there's adequate representation at this time is does King County, their nonpartisan director of all elections, whether they're partisan or not, and whose statutory duty is to basically conduct elections and to administer the process -- is that main duty in line with does it adequately represent the issue that's presented by the proposed intervenor?

Some of the case law says that we need to look at questions such as will King County make the same arguments before the Court as the proposed
intervenors? Will King County be able to do so effectively, as effectively? Will they feel compelled to do so? And if they are not, then the Court can take a look at whether or not the proposed moving interests would be adequately represented.

As I've stated, the main interest of King County is different from that of the proposed intervenor, and my conclusion from looking at this total picture is that the interests of the proposed intervenor would not be adequately represented by the existing parties. With that, then, I believe that under $24(\mathrm{a})(2)$, the intervention of right, the motion should be granted.

With respect to $24(\mathrm{a})$-- (b), permissive intervention, the rule says that "when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." And that is certainly the case here that concerns what happened with the election, whether or not there were insecure ballot boxes, and whether or not somebody was in a position to add or subtract from the ballot box, as I heard in the argument. The -- so there is a question of law or fact that's in common.

The Court does not conclude that the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of any of the parties in this case. I appreciate the moving party's suggestion that they will not be moving to dismiss the case and in any other way disrupt the existing schedule, which does call for a trial October the 23rd, 2023, according to the order amending case schedule, which is dated January 20, 2023.

So with that, the Court grants the motion to intervene as a matter of right and believes also that even if it's not a matter of right under $24(a)$, permissive would be appropriate under $24(\mathrm{~b})$.

Is there anything else from the parties at this time?

ATTY. ALMON-GRIFFIN: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

ATTY. HACKETT: Thank you, Your Honor.
ATTY. SHOGREN: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So I have a proposed order from the moving party. I will be signing that order, and it will be circulated to the parties and/or it will be filed.

I believe that our next hearing is in June; is that right?

ATTY. SHOGREN: That's correct.
ATTY. HACKETT: I believe --

ATTY. SHOGREN: June 2nd.
ATTY. HACKETT: Yes.
THE COURT: And at that time, we will be entertaining the motions to dismiss and something else? I don't have that order in front of me. So would it --

ATTY. SHOGREN: It's a -- it's a motion to show cause, a motion for declaratory judgment, and a motion for summary judgment.

THE COURT: All right.
ATTY. SHOGREN: Three motions.
THE COURT: Three. That's going to be a lot of reading, and we'll get it down as long as the information is concise, as you have been already.

Thank you. Have a pleasant afternoon.
ATTY. SHOGREN: Thank you, Your Honor.
ATtY. HACKETT: Thank you.
(Recording ends at 2:28 p.m.)

C E R T I F I CATE STATE OF WASHINGTON ) COUNTY OF KING )

I, a Reporter and Washington Certified Court Reporter, hereby certify that the foregoing audio-recorded proceeding was transcribed under my direction; that the transcript of the proceeding is a full, true and correct transcript to the best of my ability; that $I$ am neither attorney for nor a relative or employee of any of the parties to the action or any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto nor financially interested in its outcome.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 16th day of August, 2023.

Douglas Armstrong, RPR

Washington Certified Court Reporter No. 3444 License expires 11/26/2023

