### EXHIBIT A

### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a Washington State Nonprofit Corporation; DOUG BASLER; HOWARD FERGUSON; DIANA BASS; TIMOFEY SAMOYLENKO; MARY HALLOWELL; SAMANTHA BUCARI; RONALD STEWART; LYDIA ZIBIN; CATHERINE DODSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JULIE WISE, King County Director of Elections; KING COUNTY, and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

Defendants,

and

 WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE,

Proposed Intervenor Defendant.

No. 21-2-12603-7 KNT

WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S [PROPOSED] ANSWER

WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S [PROPOSED] ANSWER – 1

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#### **ANSWER**

Applicant Intervenor-Defendants Washington State Democratic Central Committee ("WSDCC") by and through its attorneys, submit the following Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint (the "Complaint"). WSDCC responds to the allegations in the Complaint as follows:

#### I. PARTIES

- 1. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 1, and therefore denies the same.
- 2. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 2, and therefore denies the same.
- 3. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 3, and therefore denies the same.
- 4. Paragraph 4 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.

#### II. OVERVIEW

5. Proposed Intervenor denies the first sentence of paragraph 5. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations that WEiCU issued a records request for ballots, and therefore denies the same. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 5 are mere

characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.

#### III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, LIMITATIONS

- 6. Paragraph 6 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 7. Paragraph 7 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 8. Paragraph 8 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 9. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 9, and therefore denies the same.

# IV. WRONGFUL ACTS: USE OF CERTIFIED VOTING SYSTEM RCW 29A.68.013(1) and/or (2)

#### (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 10. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 11. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 11.
- 12. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 12, and therefore denies the same.

- 13. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 13, and therefore denies the same.
  - 14. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 14.
  - 15. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 15.

#### V. DECLARATORY RELIEF: USE OF UNCERTIFIED VOTING SYSTEM (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 16. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- Paragraph 17 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and 17. conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 18. Paragraph 18 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 19. Paragraph 19 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.

#### VI. **EQUITABLE RELIEF: USE OF UNCERTIFIED VOTING SYSTEM** (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 20. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 21. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 21.
  - 22. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 22.

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### VII. WRONGFUL ACTS: VOTE FLIPPING, ADDITIONS, AND/OR DELETIONS RCW 29A.68.013(1) and/or (2)

#### (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 23. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 24. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 24.
  - 25. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 25.
  - 26. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 26.

### VIII. DECLARATORY RELIEF: VOTE FILLING, ADDITIONS, AND/OR DELETION

#### (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 27. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 28. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 28.
  - 29. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 29.

### IX. EQUITABLE RELIEF: VOTE FLIPPING, ADDITIONS, AND/OR DELETIONS

#### (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 30. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 31. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 31.
  - 32. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 32.

#### X. WRONGFUL ACTS: PARTY PREFERENCE

RCW 29A.68.013(1) and/or (2)

(Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 33. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 34. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 34.

#### XI. DECLARATORY RELIEF: PARTY PREFERENCE

#### (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 35. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 36. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 36.
  - 37. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 37.

#### XII. EQUITABLE RELIEF: PARTY PREFERENCE

(Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 38. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuring paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 39. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 39.
  - 40. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 40.

#### XIII. WRONGFUL ACTS: BALLOT SECURITY

RCW 29A.68.013(1) and/or (2)

(Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 41. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuring paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 42. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 42.

#### XIV. DECLARATORY RELIEF: BALLOT SECURITY

(Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 43. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuring paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 44. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 44.
  - 45. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 45.

### XV. EQUITABLE RELIEF: BALLOT SECURITY (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 46. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuring paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 47. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 47.
  - 48. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 48.

#### XVI. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

# RCW 29A.68.013(1) and/or (2); RCW 42.56.030; RCW 42.56.550; RCW 29A.60.110 (Plaintiff WEiCU v. Director and County)

- 49. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- 50. Paragraph 50 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 51. Proposed Intervenor is without sufficient information or knowledge with which to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in Paragraph 51, and therefore denies the same.
- 52. Paragraph 52 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.

- 53. Paragraph 53 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 54. Paragraph 54 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 55. Paragraph 55 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
  - 56. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 56.

# XVII. DECLARATORY RELIEF: VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WA STATE CONSTITUTION ART. I, § 1, § 2, § 3, § 12, § 19, § 29; ART. VI, § 6, US CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS I, XIV

(Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 57. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- 58. Paragraph 58 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
- 59. Paragraph 59 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
  - 60. Article I Section 3 of the Washington State Constitution speaks for itself.

- 61. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 61.
- 62. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 62.
- 63. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 63.

### XVIII. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 64. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 65. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 65.
  - 66. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 66.

## XIX. DAMAGES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 42 USC § 1983, § 1988

#### (Citizen Plaintiffs v. Director)

- 67. Proposed Intervenor incorporates by reference all of its responses in the preceding and ensuing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
  - 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 speaks for itself.
- 69. Paragraph 69 contains mere characterizations, legal contentions, and conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations.
  - 70. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 70.
  - 71. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 71.

#### XX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

72. Proposed Intervenor denies the allegations in Paragraph 72.

#### XXI. RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, Proposed Intervenor respectfully requests that this Court:

- A. Deny that Plaintiffs is entitled to any relief;
- B. Dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice;
- C. Award Proposed Intervenor its attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action; and
  - D. Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

#### **DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES**

Proposed Intervenor sets forth its affirmative defenses without assuming the burden of proving any fact, issue, or element of a cause of action where such burden properly belongs to Proposed Intervenor. Moreover, nothing stated here is intended or shall be construed as an admission that any particular issue or subject matter is relevant to the allegations in the Complaint. Proposed Intervenor reserves the right to amend or supplement its affirmative defenses as additional facts concerning defenses become known.

Proposed Intervenor alleges as follows:

- 1. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims.
- 2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by RCW 29A.68.011 and 29A.68.013, laches, estoppel, and/or waiver.
- 3. Plaintiffs' claims are moot.
- 4. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

# EXHIBIT B

### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a Washington State Nonprofit Corporation; DOUG BASLER; HOWARD FERGUSON; DIANA BASS; TIMOFEY SAMOYLENKO; MARY HALLOWELL; SAMANTHA BUCARI; RONALD STEWART; LYDIA ZIBIN; CATHERINE DODSON,

Plaintiff, v. JULIE WISE, King County Director of Elections KING COUNTY, and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

Defendants,

and

 WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE,

Proposed Intervenor-Defendant. No. 21-2-12603-7 KNT

DECLARATION OF TINA PODLODOWSKI IN SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE

#### **DECLARATION OF TINA PODLODOWSKI**

I, Tina Podlodowski, do hereby declare:

1. I am the current State Party Chair of the Washington State Democratic Party. I have held that title since I was elected to my first term as Chair in 2017.

2. The Washington State Democratic Central Committee ("WSDCC") is the governing body of the Washington State Democratic Party, made up of two people of different gender identities from each Legislative District and County. Specifically, the WSDCC has 176 State Committee Members from 88 different Local Party Organizations, including 49 Legislative District and 39 County organizations. It holds three annual meetings, nominates and endorses local candidates, recruits and manages precinct committee officers, passes resolutions, and campaigns for local candidates.

3. The WSDCC works to elect Democrats, uphold Democratic values, and support Democrat voters and candidates across the state.

4. As part of its work to uphold Democratic values, the WSDCC fights for equal access to the franchise because we believe that the right to vote is the foundation of democracy. The WSDCC believes that our government is stronger if every voice is heard and that injustice in our election system means many communities, especially communities of color and the disability community, are not being fairly represented by government.

5. The WSDCC believes that conservative groups have resorted to making unsupported claims of voter and election fraud to mislead voters. The WSDCC is committed to fighting back against this rhetoric, and against any attempts to restrict the right to vote based on these groundless assertions.

6. Groups like the Washington Election Integrity Coalition United ("WeICU") suggest that fraud is perpetrated by or to benefit Democratic election officials. To fulfill its mission of supporting Democratic voters and candidates, the WSDCC must be able to defend its candidates' victories and reputations against the WeICU's allegations.

#### I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: March 30, 2023

Tina Podlodowski

Washington State Democratic Central Committee

# EXHIBIT C

#### THE HONORABLE LEROY MCCULLOUGH

### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a Washington State Nonprofit Corporation; DOUG BASLER; HOWARD FERGUSON; DIANA BASS; TIMOFEY SAMOYLENKO; MARY HALLOWELL; SAMANTHA BUCARI; RONALD STEWART; LYDIA ZIBIN; CATHERINE DODSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JULIE WISE, Director of King County Elections; KING COUNTY, and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

Defendants,

and

WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE,

Proposed Intervenor-Defendant. No. 21 2 12603-7 KNT

WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S [PROPOSED] MOTION TO DISMISS

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

"Unless an election is clearly invalid, when the people have spoken, their verdict should not be disturbed by the courts." *Dumas v. Gagner*, 137 Wn. 2d 268, 283, 971 P.2d 17 (1999) (citations omitted). The people of Washington have spoken. Four million Washingtonians voted in the November 2020 General Election. That election has been audited pursuant to state law, certified by county election officials, and certified by Washington's Secretary of State. Certificates of Election have been issued to all of the prevailing candidates, all of whom have been sworn in and have held office since January 8, 2021.

Over a full year after the election, the Washington Election Integrity Coalition United ("WEiCU") and several individual *pro se* voters filed this election contest raising fantastical allegations, seeking to call into question the legitimacy of Washington's November 2020 Election and question the integrity of the King County ("the County") Director of Elections, Julie Wise, and the County's election officials. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the County broke Washington law and violated the Washington and U.S. Constitution, and to bar the County from doing so moving forward. Plaintiffs also ask for an extra-legal license to "audit" the County's election department and assert that they should be permitted to inspect sealed ballots from the 2020 election. But their claims fail as a matter of law, their extraordinary and sweeping relief is not justified, and their Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

At the outset, while Plaintiffs state they do not wish to de-certify any election and even fail to challenge the election of a particular candidate, Plaintiffs' challenge is, at bottom, an election contest (although a vague and patently insufficient one). Their Complaint can and should be dismissed on this basis alone, because Plaintiffs are far beyond the narrow ten-day statute of limitations applicable to such claims. *See* RCW 29A.68.011; RCW 29A.68.013.

This flaw independently precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs' claims.

Even if this action were deemed not to be an "election contest" under RCW 29A.68.011 or 29A.68.013, whatever it is, Plaintiffs' delay in filing this claim also warrants application of the equitable doctrine of laches, which moots their claims.

Plaintiffs in any event lack standing to bring this action, as they have not suffered any personal injury, nor have they requested any relief that would redress the supposed fraud that they allege occurred in November 2020. Instead, Plaintiffs stitch together a series of alleged misconduct that would have taken a statewide conspiracy to accomplish. Their baseless assertions do not state any cognizable legal claim. Plaintiffs fail to assert the most basic essential requirement for a cognizable election contest: that the outcome of Washington's November 2020 Election was changed as a result of the County's alleged misconduct. Plaintiffs' sparse and implausible facts also fall far short of that required by CR 8(a), much less the *heightened* pleading requirements for claims sounding in fraud under CR 9(b).

This election contest is one in a long line of lawsuits promoting conspiracy theories of election and voter fraud that have been thoroughly debunked. Not one of those election contests was successful, ultimately resulting in at least 60 courtroom losses for the Trump Campaign and other groups seeking his reelection or to otherwise challenge the outcome of the 2020 General Election.<sup>1</sup> Despite those 60 lawsuits, Georgia counting their ballots three

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> William Cummings et al., *By the numbers: President Donald Trump's failed efforts to overturn the election*, USA NEWS TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/.

times,<sup>2</sup> and a Republican-led audit in Arizona,<sup>3</sup> the results of the November 2020 General Election never changed. President Joseph Biden was inaugurated on January 20, 2020, having received more than 81 million votes (more than any President in American history).<sup>4</sup>

This lawsuit is entirely unfounded and appears to be little more than a coordinated political attack on the integrity of Washington elections.<sup>5</sup> It is plainly barred as a matter of law and should be promptly dismissed with prejudice.

#### II. ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because it is untimely, Plaintiffs lack standing, and the claims are most and barred by the doctrine of laches, and because Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim.

#### III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

Defendants rely on the allegations in this Motion, the documents it incorporates by reference, and facts that are subject to judicial notice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Chandelis Duster, Georgia reaffirms Biden's victory for 3rd time after recount, dealing major blow to Trump's attempt to overturn the results, CNN (Dec. 7, 2020, 5:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/07/politics/georgia-recount-recertification-biden/index.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Jack Healy et al., *Republican Review of Arizona Vote Fails to Show Stolen Election*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/us/arizona-election-review-trump-biden.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Jemima McEvoy, *Biden Wins More Votes Than Any Other Presidential Candidate In U.S. History*, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2020, 1:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/11/04/biden-wins-more-votes-than-any-other-presidential-candidate-in-us-history/?sh=131798867c3a.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This lawsuit is one of several virtually identical lawsuits filed across Washington State. *See Infra* at IV. Each of the lawsuits was filed by the "Washington Election Integrity Coalition United" and a county-specific collection of *pro se* voters, apparently recruited for this purpose. *See* Associated Press, *Lawsuits claiming 2020 ballots were manipulated come to WA*, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 21, 2021, 10:36 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/lawsuits-claiming-2020-ballots-were-manipulated-come-to-washington/; Shari Phiel, *Lawsuits Filed in Three Washington Counties Claim Votes Were 'Flipped'*, THE CHRONICLE, https://www.chronline.com/stories/lawsuits-filed-in-three-washington-counties-claim-votes-were-flipped,273108.

#### IV. BACKGROUND

#### Plaintiffs' Challenge The 2020 Election

Over four million Washingtonians cast their ballots in Washington's November 2020 General Election.<sup>6</sup> That election was audited pursuant to state law and certified by county election officials.<sup>7</sup> The Secretary of State certified the election results on December 3, 2020, declaring victory for numerous Washington State Democratic Central Committee ("WSDCC") candidates across the State.<sup>8</sup> Certificates of Election have been issued to all of the prevailing candidates,<sup>9</sup> all of whom have been sworn in and have held office since January 8, 2021.<sup>10</sup>

Nearly a *year* after the election, Plaintiff WEiCU filed this election contest, asserting that widespread election fraud occurred during Washington's November 2020 General Election. WEiCU describes itself as a nonprofit corporation operating out of Pierce County, Washington. Compl. ¶ 2. WEiCU does not describe its mission, who its members are, or how it has any interest in filing this lawsuit. Several *pro se* Plaintiffs have joined, none of whom allege or even explain who they are or how they have allegedly been harmed.

Together, without explaining the factual basis for their claims, Plaintiffs assert that the County Director engaged in widespread "election fraud" by: flipping, deleting, and adding votes; participating in "party preference"; identifying who voted some ballots and creating a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Elections and Voting, SECRETARY OF STATE: KIM WYMAN, https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20201103/president-vice-president.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2021). 

<sup>7</sup> See RCW 29A.60.185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Elections and Voting, SECRETARY OF STATE: KIM WYMAN, https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20201103/president-vice-president.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2021).
<sup>9</sup> See RCW 29A.52.370.

Jasmyne Keimig, *The 2021 Legislative Session Kicks Off With Virtual Swearing-In Ceremonies*, THE STRANGER (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2021/01/08/54577174/the-2021-legislative-session-kicks-off-with-virtual-swearing-in-ceremony.

"record of the voters' party preferences"; and leaving ballots unsecure. \(^{11}\) Compl. \(^{\quad}\) 10–15, 23–26, 33–34. Plaintiffs also assert, without any factual basis, that 400,000 votes were added, 6,000 votes were flipped, and "thousands of voters were removed" in "one or more statewide races before, during, and/or after the election"—an unidentified portion of which was perpetrated in the County by the Director or by other election officials. *Id.* \(^{\quad}\) 26.

Plaintiffs further allege that they attempted to serve the County with a public records request under Washington's Public Record Act ("PRA") so that they could inspect ballots from the 2020 election, but that the County denied their request. *Id.* ¶ 51. Plaintiffs challenge the County's actions under Washington's election contest statutes, contend that the County violated the PRA, and allege an assortment of federal and state constitutional claims. *Id.* ¶ 5.

Despite its long-winded and unsupported accusations, Plaintiff WEiCU does not identify a single member in its organization who was unable to vote, whose ballot was not kept secret or secure, whose vote was not counted, whose vote was "flipped," or who suffered any other kind of identifiable harm. Not one. The individual Plaintiffs, for their part, fail to allege that they were aggrieved in a discernable way by any of the County's actions. Indeed, the individual Plaintiffs do not even complain that they voted for a candidate who lost his or her election. Plaintiffs do not claim that any of the County's actions affected enough ballots to change the results of the election. Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that they are not contesting the election of *any* candidate elected to office and explicitly state that they are not asking to decertify the election. *Id.* ¶ 8.

Plaintiffs allege no plausible facts to justify their claims. Plaintiffs instead allege that they are "informed and believe" that the Director "maintained a record of County electors party preference" and "identif[ied] ballots cast by County electors in the Election by party

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> WSDCC takes the facts alleged as true for purposes of this Motion only, as it must.

preference" in violation of the Director's "Oath of impartiality." Id. ¶ 34. They provide no support for this assertion beyond their "information and belief." Plaintiffs also allege, without more, that Plaintiffs are "informed and believe" that the Director "engaged in wrongful acts, errors, and/or neglect of duty by allowing and/or facilitating electronic manipulation of the voting results from the Election." Id. ¶ 28. They provide no further explanation or factual basis for this assertion.

Despite the fact that Plaintiffs do not challenge the election results, Plaintiffs insist that the Court must "ascertain, determine, and declare Plaintiffs' rights and duties of the Director as they pertain to the Election and future elections." *Id.* ¶ 63. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek three remedies. First, Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue an order declaring that the County broke state law and the Washington and U.S. Constitutions, and request that the Court permanently enjoin the County from doing so moving forward. *Id.* ¶ 16–17. Second, Plaintiffs seek license to conduct a "full forensic audit" of the County's election department "in coordination with Jovan Hutton Pulitzer." *Id.* ¶ 5, 56. Third, Plaintiffs request that the Court order the County to unseal an unspecified number of ballots from the County so that they may "prove (or disprove)" their allegations. *Id.* ¶ 56. Plaintiffs also ask that the Court award it costs. *Id.* ¶ 71. None of this is remotely supported by Washington (or federal law); indeed, it is—uniformly—*barred* by Washington (and federal) law.

#### **Procedural History**

WSDCC sought to intervene in this action on October 6, 2021, two weeks after the complaint was filed. Wash. State Democratic Cen. Comm. Mot. to Intervene, DKT 8, Oct. 6, 2021. On October 13, 2022, before that Motion was decided, Defendants filed a notice of removal in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Wise*, No. 2:21-cv-01394-LK, ECF No. 1.

WSDCC promptly sought to intervene in the federal court. *Id.* at ECF No. 14. On October 20, 2021, the King County Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim against Plaintiffs before the federal court. *Id.* at ECF No. 10.

Plaintiff WEiCU filed similar lawsuits across Washington State, including against Clark, Snohomish, Whatcom, Lincoln, Franklin, Thurston, and Pierce counties. <sup>12</sup> Each of the lawsuits contained virtually identical claims on behalf of WEiCU and different county-specific collections of pro se individuals. WSDCC sought to intervene in those actions before the respective superior courts. <sup>13</sup> Defendants in the Clark, Snohomish, Whatcom, Thurston, and Pierce cases also removed, and this action was consolidated with those cases. <sup>14</sup> WSDCC also promptly sought to intervene in each of the federal cases. *Id.* at ECF No. 14.

The Lincoln and Franklin County cases remained in state court. WSDCC was granted intervention as of right in Lincoln County. *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher*, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Feb. 14, 2022). Both

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Anderson, No. 21-2-07551-9 (Sept. 21, 2021); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Hall, No. 21-2-01641-34 (Sept. 21, 2021); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Kimsey, No. 21-2-01775-06 (Sept. 16, 2021); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Fell, No. 21-2-04302-31 (Sept. 16, 2021); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Bradrick, No. 21-2-00949-37 (Sept. 10, 2021); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Beaton, No. 21-2-50572-11 (Oct. 5, 2021); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher, No. 21-2-00042-22 (Oct. 4, 2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> WSDCC sought to intervene in Clark, Whatcom, Lincoln, Franklin, and Thurston County superior courts. *See Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Hall*, No. 21-2-01641-34 (Oct. 6, 2021); *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Kimsey*, No. 21-2-006 (Oct. 6, 2021); *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Bradrick*, No. 21-2-00949-37 (Oct. 6, 2021); *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Beaton*, No. 21-2-50572-11 (Oct. 8, 2021); *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher*, No. 21-2-00042-22 (Oct. 11, 2021). WSDCC did not seek to intervene in Snohomish and Pierce County, since both were removed immediately after they were filed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Anderson, No. 3:21-cv-05726-LK, ECF No. 1; Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Hall, No. 3:21-cv-05787-LK, ECF No. 1; Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Kimsey, No. 3:21-cv-05746-LK, ECF No. 1; Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Fell, No. 2:21-cv-1354-LK, ECF No. 1; Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Bradrick, No. 2:21-cv-01386-LK, ECF No. 1.

WSDCC and Lincoln County filed motions to dismiss and, on March 28, 2022, the Lincoln County Superior Court granted those motions. *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher*, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Mar. 28, 2022)). The Franklin County Superior Court similarly disposed of WEiCU's election contest filed there (prior to ruling on WSDCC's Motion to Intervene in that action). *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Beaton et al.*, No. 21-2-50572-11, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2022).

As a result of their frivolous election claims, the Lincoln County Superior Court ordered plaintiffs to pay the County's defense costs of \$22,585.31. *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher*, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Mar. 28, 2022); *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher*, No. 21-2-00042-22, J. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. April 22, 2022). This is not the only time WEiCU has been sanctioned in connection with their baseless challenge to the November 2020 General Election. The Washington Supreme Court also ordered WEiCU to pay \$28,384.70 as a result of an election lawsuit filed directly with the Supreme Court. *See* Hamilton Decl., Exs. H, I, J. Washington's Solicitor General subsequently filed a bar complaint against WEiCU's counsel, Virginia Shogren, stating that there is "no meaningful dispute" that she had "specific knowledge that the legal arguments about certain essential elements were frivolous." *See* Decl. of Kevin J. Hamilton ISO Motion to Intervene, Ex. K at 2.

On September 30, 2022, the federal court determined that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and that the court had no supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. *Id.* at ECF No. 44. The court dismissed the Pierce, Clark, Snohomish, Whatcom, Thurston, and Pierce cases with prejudice, since remand would be futile (because the underlying state law

claims were obviously meritless and their dismissal by the state courts was inevitable). However, since the King County Defendants had filed meaningful *counterclaims*, the federal court remanded all of the state law claims to this Court (including Defendants' counterclaims). *Id.* On October 17, 2022, the federal court notified this Court that this action was remanded. Notice of Remand, DKT 15.

Plaintiffs return to this Court with nothing but speculation, asking for breathtaking and entirely unwarranted "relief." This litigation should be promptly dismissed with prejudice: it is untimely, Plaintiffs lack standing, their claims are most and barred by the doctrine of laches, and Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim.

#### V. ARGUMENT

#### A. Legal Standard

A complaint must include either "direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal theory" or "allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." *Havsy v. Flynn*, 88 Wn. App. 514, 518, 945 P.2d 221 (1997). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate when "a plaintiff's claim remains legally insufficient even under his or her proffered hypothetical facts." *Gorman v. Garlock, Inc.*, 155 Wn.2d 198, 215, 118 P.3d 311 (2005). In other words, although the Court must accept all of Plaintiffs' factual allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, dismissal is appropriate if the complaint alleges no facts that would justify the relief Plaintiffs request. *Gorman v. City of Woodinville*, 175 Wn.2d 68, 71, 283 P.3d 1082 (2012).

Where plaintiffs plead fraud or mistake, Washington's civil rules impose a heightened standard. Under CR 9(b), "[i]n *all averments of fraud* or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity" (emphasis added). It is not

necessary under CR 9 "that the word 'fraud' be used in the complaint, as long as facts are pleaded sufficient to present the question of fraud." *Pedersen v. Bibioff*, 64 Wn. App. 710, 721, 828 P.2d 1113 (1992) (citing *Harstad v. Frol*, 41 Wn. App. 294, 301, 704 P.2d 638 (1985)). "A complaint adequately alleges fraud if it informs the defendant of who did what, and describes the fraudulent conduct and mechanisms." *Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle v. Aden*, 162 Wash. App. 1019, 2011 WL 2306046, at \*2 (2011) (citing *Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys.*, 109 Wn. 2d 107, 165–166, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987)). A motion to dismiss under CR 9(b) for failure to plead with particularity is the functional equivalent of a CR 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. *Id.* (citing *Haberman*, 109 Wn.2d at 120, 165–66).

Application of these standards to Plaintiffs' Complaint mandates prompt dismissal.

#### B. This Election Contest is Untimely Under RCW 29A.68.013

The time to file an election contest has long expired.

Washington law permits a registered voter to contest an election *only* if an affidavit of an elector is filed within ten days of certification. RCW 29A.68.013 ("An affidavit of an elector under this subsection shall be filed with the appropriate court no later than *ten days* following the official certification of the primary or election ...") (emphasis added); *see* RCW 29A.68.013. If the ten-day deadline is ignored, the contest must be dismissed for untimeliness. *See Becker v. Cnty. of Pierce*, 126 Wn.2d 11, 21, 890 P.2d 1055 (1995) (dismissing an election contest as untimely where plaintiff "filed her complaint more than a year after the date that the general election . . ."); *cf. In re Feb. 14, 2017, Special Election on Moses Lake Sch. Dist.* #161 Proposition 1, 2 Wn. App. 2d 689, 695–96, 413 P.3d 577 (2018) (determining "timeliness" of an election contest based on whether an affidavit was filed within ten days of

certification). Here, the Secretary of State certified the election results on December 3, 2020.<sup>15</sup> Plaintiffs' deadline to file an affidavit from an elector was therefore ten days after December 3—December 13, 2020. Plaintiffs are 297 days too late. Plaintiffs had an affirmative obligation to air their concerns before or immediately after the election to avoid precisely these belated, could-have should-have complaints.

Plaintiffs assert (without support) that Washington's ten-day deadline for election contests does not bar their claims, Compl. ¶ 8, but their assertion is contrary to the essence of their Complaint and the plain letter of the law. Plaintiffs' Complaint, as even a cursory examination reveals, accused the County of "ballot box stuffing," tracking voters by "party preference," "flipping" or "adding" some unspecified number of hundreds of thousands of votes across the State—allegations that directly targets the election's outcome *Id.* ¶ 29. This is the very definition of an election contest. Moreover, nearly all of Plaintiffs' claims cite exclusively to Washington's election contest statute, RCW 29A.68.013, as their legal basis. *See* RCW 29A.68.020 ("All election contests must proceed under RCW 29A.68.011 or 29A.68.013."). Regardless of their attempt to skirt around the election contest statute, the heart of their action is just that—a challenge to the election result. Indeed, Plaintiffs' PRA claim to inspect sealed ballots can only be grounded in an election contest. There are very few circumstances where ballots may be inspected post-election, and only one is potentially applicable here: pursuant to RCW 29A.60.110(2), a superior court may order the unsealing of ballots "in a contest or election dispute."

Lections and Voting, SECRETARY OF STATE: KIM WYMAN https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20201103/president-vice-president.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2021). In ruling on this Motion, the Court may take judicial notice of "public documents if the authenticity of those documents cannot be reasonably disputed." Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 186 Wn. App. 838, 844, 347 P.3d 487 (2015) (citing Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wn.2d 756, 763, 567 P.2d 187 (1977)). The cited website is the Secretary of State's public website and is "not subject to reasonable dispute," thus, the Court may take judicial notice of the December 3 certification date.

Washington law is clear: "[a]ll election contests must proceed under RCW 29A.68.011 or 29A.68.013." RCW 29A.68.020. This is an election contest. It is untimely. It must be dismissed on this basis alone. See Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Wise, No. 2:21-cv-01394-LK, ECF No. 44 at 13 (noting "Section 29A.68.013 of the Revised Code of Washington sets a strict ten-day time limit for election contests, and that time limit has long passed with respect to the 2020 election.); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Mar. 28, 2022) (dismissing complaint by WEiCU and pro se plaintiff "fail[ed] to state an election claim upon which relief may be granted"); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Beaton et al., No. 21-2-50572-11, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2022) (same).

#### C. Plaintiffs Lack Standing

Even if this matter was not time barred (and it is), neither WEiCU nor the individual Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims.

Washington courts have established a two-part inquiry to determine standing. First, the party must suffer an "injury in fact" by showing "a personal injury fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." *State v. Johnson*, 179 Wn.2d 534, 552, 315 P.3d 1090 (2014) (quoting *High Tide Seafoods v. State*, 106 Wn.2d 695, 702, 725 P.2d 411 (1986)). Second, the courts consider whether the interest asserted is arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the statute or constitutional guaranty in question. *Id.* Organizations, like WEiCU, "have standing to assert the interests of their members, so long as members of the organization would otherwise have standing to sue, the purpose of the organization is germane to the issue, and neither the claim nor the relief requires the participation of individual members." *Five Corners Fam. Farmers v. State*, 173 Wn.2d 296, 304, 268 P.3d 892 (2011). Plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered any

personal injuries, the interests they assert are not within the "zone of interests" meant to be protected by Washington's election contest statutes, and the Court cannot address the injuries they allege.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington has already determined that *these* very Plaintiffs lack Article III standing under federal law. *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Wise*, No. 2:21-cv-01394-LK, ECF No. 44 at 4–10.<sup>16</sup> And, both the Lincoln and Franklin County superior courts determined that neither Plaintiff WEiCU nor the pro se voter plaintiffs before them had standing under Washington's standing inquiry. *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher*, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Mar. 28, 2022) ("Plaintiffs each lack standing to bring the election claims challenged"); *Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Beaton et al.*, No. 21-2-50572-11, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2022) (same). For the reasons discussed below, the Court should do the same.

#### 1. Plaintiffs Have Not Suffered an Injury in Fact

#### a. Plaintiffs Lack Standing Under the Election Contest Statutes

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs plainly lack standing under the election contest statutes. The statutes confer a private right of action for "registered voter[s]," but not to just any registered voters—only registered voters who are "challeng[ing] the right to assume office of a candidate declared elected to that office ... the right of a candidate to appear on the general election ballot after a primary, or ... certification of the result of an election on any measure." RCW 29A.68.020.

WEiCU obviously does not qualify as a "registered voter." And the individual Plaintiffs seek none of this relief, and therefore do not seek to invoke an interest within the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Forbes v. Pierce Cnty., 5 Wn.2d 423, 434 n.2, 427 P.3d 675 (2018) (Washington Supreme Court referring to the federal standing doctrine under Article III as "instructive.").

"zone of interests" protected by the statute. *Johnson*, 179 Wn.2d at 552. Indeed, as Plaintiffs are admittedly not seeking to de-certify the election and do not challenge the election of a single candidate, it is difficult to understand what interest Plaintiffs are seeking with respect to an election nearly a year old. Compl. ¶ 8. This is plainly insufficient to confer standing.

#### b. WEiCU Lacks Representational Standing

Plaintiff WEiCU has failed to describe its mission as an organization, explain its membership, or otherwise explain why it has any interest in this action. It has therefore failed to show that it has representational standing to bring any of the constitutional claims it purports to assert. *Five Corners Fam. Farmers*, 173 Wn.2d at 304 (for representational standing, an organizations' members must otherwise have standing and the purpose of the organization must be germane to the issue).

#### c. Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claims are Generalized Grievances

Plaintiffs' more generalized complaint that the Washington and U.S. constitutions were violated does not state an injury in fact. At a minimum, Plaintiffs must state a *personal* injury to have standing. *Johnson*, 179 Wn.2d at 552. Plaintiffs' broad assertion that their "due process, free speech, and equal protection" rights were "abridged" is insufficient to support standing because Plaintiffs do not specify precisely how they were personally injured. This is fatal. *See Wood v. Raffensperger*, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1321–23 (N.D. Ga 2020) (finding individual Georgia voter lacked standing to challenge results of 2020 election under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause based on a "generalized grievance regarding a state government's failure to properly follow" the law); *Wis. Voters All. v. Pence*, 514 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2021) ("To the extent that they argue more broadly that voters maintain an interest in an election conducted in conformity with the Constitution, they merely assert a 'generalized grievance' stemming from an attempt to have the Government act in accordance

with their view of the law."); *Bowyer v. Ducey*, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 711 (D. Ariz. 2020) ("[W]here, as here, the injury alleged by plaintiffs is that defendants failed to follow the Elections Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that the injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that courts have refused to countenance.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).

For its part, Plaintiff WEiCU does not identify a single member at all, let alone a member that was unable to vote, <sup>17</sup> whose ballot was not kept secret, <sup>18</sup> whose vote was not counted, whose vote was "flipped," or who was otherwise personally injured. The individual Plaintiffs also do not assert that any of these constitutional harms personally befell them. When the injury alleged "is that the law ... has not been followed," it is "the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government" that is not an injury in fact. *Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm'n*, 495 F.3d 1324, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2007). Even where constitutional harms are alleged, a plaintiff's "interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws" is a generalized grievance that simply does not support standing. *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).

#### d. Plaintiffs were not Injured by any Equal Protection Violations

Plaintiffs' assertion that their Equal Protection rights were *personally* violated is patently insufficient. Plaintiffs allege that their Equal Protection rights were violated because

<sup>17</sup> Plaintiffs assert violations of Article I, Section 19 of the Washington Constitution. But Article I, Section 19 is not implicated if Plaintiffs' right to vote "was not impeded in any way." *Brower v. State*, 137 Wn.2d 44, 68, 969 P.2d 42 (1998) ("Article I, section 19 is not implicated in this case. ... Mr. Brower's right to vote in that election was not impeded in any way."). No plaintiff asserts their right to vote was impeded.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Plaintiffs assert violations of Washington Constitution Article 6, Section 6. To state a cognizable claim under Article 6, Section 6, "[t]he central concern of ballot secrecy, therefore, is whether the individual voter can be identified." *White v. Wyman*, 4 Wn. App.2d 1071, 2018 WL 3738404, \*4 (2018). No Plaintiff has alleged that they, as an individual voter was identified, nor has WEiCU named any member who was identified.

"[b]allots from County electors, including Plaintiffs herein, were not treated equally," Compl. ¶ 61(e), but the question for standing purposes is not whether Plaintiffs were treated "differently" but whether Plaintiffs were <u>actually injured</u> by differential treatment. *State v. Pedro*, 148 Wn. App. 932, 945, 201 P.3d 398 (2009) (explaining that, for standing purposes in an equal protection case, the question was not whether plaintiff was treated "unequally" but whether plaintiff was "adversely affected").

Taking Plaintiffs' allegations as true, every County voter would have been treated "unequally," in that some voters' ballots were allegedly "flipped" based on who they voted for, while others' ballots were not. But to have standing, at a minimum, a plaintiff would need to allege that they were *personally injured*. See State v. Farmer, 116 Wn. 2d 414, 423, 805 P.2d 200 (1991) (adult plaintiff suffered no "prejudice," and therefore had no standing to assert that a statute violated the equal protection clause, because plaintiff only alleged that the statute adversely impacted children); see also Haberman, 109 Wn.2d at 138–39 (plaintiffs lacked standing and could not "assert the equal protection rights of other[s]"). WEiCU did not allege that any of its members votes were flipped. Plaintiffs have not done so and cannot assert the equal protection rights of others.

#### e. Vote Dilution Claims are Generalized Grievances

The only other injury claimed by Plaintiffs is the alleged "dilution" of Washingtonian voters' votes. Compl. ¶ 61(b). But courts have long held that an alleged injury of vote dilution from the threat of potential fraud does not confer standing, as it is both unduly speculative and impermissibly generalized. *See, e.g., Martel v. Condos*, 487 F. Supp. 3d 247, 253 (D. Vt. 2020) ("If every voter suffers the same incremental dilution of the franchise caused by some third-party's fraudulent vote, then these voters have experienced a generalized injury."); *Am. C. R. Union v. Martinez-Rivera*, 166 F. Supp. 3d 779, 789 (W.D. Tex. 2015) ("[T]he risk of

vote dilution[is] speculative and, as such, [is] more akin to a generalized grievance about the government than an injury in fact."); *cf. Paher v. Cegavske*, 457 F. Supp. 3d 919, 926 (D. Nev. 2020) (citations omitted) ("Plaintiffs' purported injury of having their votes diluted due to ostensible election fraud may be conceivably raised by any Nevada voter [and] does not satisfy the requirement that Plaintiffs must state a concrete and particularized injury."). Such is the case here. Any dilution admittedly would have affected all Washington voters, not merely Plaintiffs. Compl. ¶ 61(b). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' purported vote dilution injury is a generalized grievance and cannot support standing as a matter of law.

#### f. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged that an Injury is Certainly Impending

For Plaintiffs to sufficiently allege a threatened injury rather than an existing injury, they must show that "the injury will be immediate, concrete, and specific; a conjectural or hypothetical injury will not confer standing." *See Knight v. City of Yelm*, 173 Wn.2d 325, 341, 267 P.3d 973 (2011) (quoting *Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Kitsap Cnty.*, 92 Wn. App. 816, 829, 965 P.2d 636 (1998)). Plaintiffs' vague assertion that the Court must "ascertain, determine, and declare Plaintiffs' rights and duties of the Director as they pertain to the Election and future elections" falls rather decidedly short of showing a concrete injury with respect to "future elections." Compl. ¶ 63. And since Plaintiffs do not even bother to mention which election they refer to, any potential future injury is entirely nonspecific and hypothetical.

#### 2. Plaintiffs Injury is not Redressable

Finally, and independently, Plaintiffs lack standing because the relief they seek would not redress the injuries they allege. *Johnson*, 179 Wn.2d at 552.

Plaintiffs seek three remedies: (1) an order declaring that the County broke the law and barring the County from doing so moving forward; (2) a license to "audit" the County's election department; and (3) an order allowing them to inspect ballots from the 2020 election.

Compl. ¶ 5, 16–17, 55. But these remedies would do nothing to change long-certified elections from November 2020. Nor does a request to have the County simply obey the law—which they are already bound to do—result in any meaningful redress. *See S.E.C. v. Goble*, 682 F.3d 934, 949 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[A]n obey-the-law injunction does little more than order the defendant to obey the law. We have repeatedly questioned the enforceability of obey-the-law injunctions."); *E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc.*, 707 F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 2013) ("An obey-the-law injunction departs from the traditional equitable principle that injunctions should prohibit no more than the violation established in the litigation or similar conduct."). Plaintiffs have not requested, and the Court cannot provide a remedy that would redress the injuries Plaintiffs are asserting.

In sum, Plaintiffs have suffered no injury, the interests they assert are not within the zone of interest protected by statute, and this Court cannot redress the injuries they claim. Plaintiffs' action must be dismissed for lack of standing.

#### D. Plaintiffs' Claims Fail Due to Mootness

For the same reasons that Plaintiffs have no standing, Plaintiffs case is moot. "A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief." *Harbor Lands LP v. City of Blaine*, 146 Wn. App. 589, 592, 191 P.3d 1282 (2008) (quoting *Orwick v. City of Seattle*, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984)). If a case is moot, a court has no jurisdiction to hear it. *Id.* (citation omitted). Plaintiffs' requests are all aimed at contesting the results of the November 2020 election. Since the time has passed for an election contest and all elections from November 2020 have been fully and finally certified, the Court has no basis to provide any kind of relief to Plaintiffs. *Jackson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of City of Chi.*, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 36, 975 N.E.2d 583, 593 (Ill. 2012) ("[C]onclusion of an election cycle normally moots an election contest."); *Brooks v. Brown*, 282 Ga. 154, 154, 646 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2007) ("In

general, election contest cases become moot once the general election in contention has occurred."); *Bowyer*, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 720 (election contest filed a month after the 2020 election was moot because the court could not "de-certify the results" and therefore "it would be meaningless to grant Plaintiffs any of the remaining relief they seek").

Indeed, Plaintiffs have not petitioned for any relief in this action other than what the Court *could have* provided if Plaintiffs filed a timely election contest. *See* RCW 29A.68.020. For that reason, the case is most and should be dismissed.

#### E. Laches Bars Plaintiffs' Claims

Plaintiffs' claims are also separately and independently barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Mar. 28, 2022) (dismissing complaint by WEiCU and pro se plaintiff based on laches). Laches protects parties from "unreasonable prejudicial delay." Tupper v. Tupper, 15 Wn. App. 2d 796, 810–11, 478 P.3d 1132 (2020). To successfully assert laches, the party employing the doctrine must prove "(1) inexcusable delay and (2) prejudice to the other party from such delay." Id. (citations omitted). The most important factor is "the resulting prejudice and damage to others." Id. (citation omitted). Laches is applied only if the party asserting it "has so altered [its] position that it would be inequitable to enforce the claim." Id. (citation omitted). That is certainly the case here.

First, Plaintiff's year-long delay is patently unreasonable. Plaintiffs' action is based on events that occurred during and immediately after the November 2020 election, and it could have and should have been raised at the time. (Indeed, state law mandates that these claims should have been raised within 10 days of certification.) Other courts considering similar challenges to election results have properly found that election challenges filed even weeks after elections are too late when plaintiffs could have filed those challenges months sooner.

E.g., Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 983 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1516, 209 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2021) (affirming district court's dismissal of election contest due to laches, and stating "[t]he timing of election litigation matters. Any claim against a state electoral procedure must be expressed expeditiously") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 1324 (concluding that plaintiff's eight-month late claims were barred by laches because the plaintiff "could have, and should have, filed his constitutional challenge much sooner than he did, and certainly not two weeks after the General Election"); King v. Whitmer, 505 F.Supp.3d at 731–32 (finding plaintiffs "showed no diligence" in asserting their claims when they waited more than 21 days after the 2020 General Election to assert claims that could have been brought "well before" the election); Bowyer, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 719 (dismissing election contest filed a month after the election due to laches because it would prejudice the 3.4 million Arizonans who voted in the 2020 General Election). Plaintiffs year-long delay is doubly inexcusable.

Second, Plaintiffs' unjustifiable delay prejudices WSDCC's affiliated candidates, who campaigned, won their elections, and have been fulfilling their duties as elected officials since January. In addition, it would prejudice the millions of voters who dutifully cast their votes according to the rules and practices that Plaintiffs could have challenged prior to or right after the election. Here, Plaintiffs waited until after the election and then much more to cast doubt on the election with entirely speculative claims. This Court should find that laches firmly bars this action.

#### F. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim

In addition to the jurisdictional bars to Plaintiffs' action, Plaintiffs' Complaint must independently be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

#### 1. Plaintiffs' Election Contest Fails

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Washington's election contest statutes. Washington law expressly limits the grounds upon which an election contest may be brought to three circumstances: (1) to challenge the right to assume office of a candidate declared elected to that office; (2) to challenge the right of a candidate to appear on the general election ballot after a primary; or (3) to challenge certification of the result of an election on any measure. RCW 29A.68.020. In other words, Washington's election contest statutes do not permit voters to bring election contests just for the sake of it—an election contest is a tool to challenge the illegitimate victory of a candidate or to de-certify an election. "[A]n election contest which fails to allege 'the particular causes of contest ... with sufficient certainty' may be dismissed." *In re Coday*, 156 Wn.2d 485, 496, 130 P.3d 809 (2006) (quoting RCW 29A.68.030).

Here, however, Plaintiffs are not asserting any of the three permissible challenges. In fact, Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the County's actions affected enough ballots to change the outcome of the election. The absence of these allegations is fatal to Plaintiffs' election contest. *Id.* at 490–91 (holding that contestants had not asserted a cognizable election contest claim because "while the contestants had proved that errors and omissions by county election officials had occurred, and that illegal votes were cast, they had not proved that the outcome of the governor's election was changed as a result.").

#### 2. Plaintiffs' Claims Under the PRA Fail

Plaintiffs have also failed to state a cognizable claim that they are entitled to inspect an unspecified number of sealed ballots. Compl. ¶ 5, 56; see also Compl. at 18 (seeking a Court order unsealing ballots). The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the Franklin County Superior Court, and Lincoln County Superior Court agreed.

Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Schumacher, No. 21-2-00042-22, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super Ct. Mar. 28, 2022) (dismissing complaint by WEiCU and pro se plaintiff because "Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Public Records Act."); Washington Election Integrity Coalition United et al. v. Beaton et al., No. 21-2-50572-11, Slip Op. at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2022) (concluding plaintiffs failed to state any valid claim).

A county may lawfully withhold production of records pursuant to the PRA if a specific exemption applies. Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 836, 240 P.3d 120 (2010). There are three sources of PRA exemptions. White v. Clark County, 188 Wn. App. 622, 630, 354 P.3d 38 (2015). First, the PRA itself contains enumerated exemptions. *Id.* (citing RCW 42.56.070(6), .210-.480). Second, the PRA states that public records can be withheld from production if they fall within any "other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." *Id.* (citing RCW 42.56.070(1)). Third, the Washington Constitution may exempt certain records. *Id.* (citing *Freedom Found. v. Gregoire*, 178 Wn.2d 686, 695, 310 P.3d 1252 (2013)). It is the second exemption to the PRA that applies here: exemptions based on an "other statute" that prohibits disclosure.

The "other statute" is RCW 29A.60.110(1), which requires county officials to seal all ballots in containers "immediately after tabulation." See Compl. at 18 (requesting an order "unsealing ballots under RCW 29A.60.110). RCW 29A.60.110 only provides four narrow circumstances in which those ballots may be unsealed: (1) to conduct recounts; (2) to conduct a random check forty-eight hours after election day; (3) for the County Auditor to conduct a pre-certification audit; or (4) by order of a superior court in a contest or election dispute. RCW 29A.60.110(2).<sup>19</sup> See White, 188 Wn. App. at 627 (holding RCW 29A.60.110 constituted

WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> WAC 434-261-045 also provides in pertinent part: "Voted ballots and voted electronic ballot images must remain in secure storage except during processing, duplication, resolution,

"other statutes" exempting ballots from disclosure); White v. Clark County, 199 Wn. App. 929, 937, 401 P.3d 375 (2017) (same).

All ballots from the 2020 election have been tabulated, the time for a recount has passed, and the results have been certified, and the time for an election contest has long passed. Plaintiffs' claim under the PRA therefore fails. *See White*, 199 Wn. App. at 934 (PRA requestor "[wa]s not entitled to disclosure of the requested [ballots] because ... both RCW 29A.60.110 and WAC 434-261-045 create an 'other statute' exemption that applies to election ballots"); *White v. Skagit County*, 188 Wn. App. 886, 898, 355 P.3d 1178 (2015) (denying PRA disclosure for electronic or digital image files of ballots used in the general election); *White*, 188 Wn. App. at 896–97 ("RCW 29A.60.110's "statutory objective is to keep ballots secure"). WEiCU is not entitled to access the ballots it seeks.

#### 3. Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims Fail

Plaintiffs' remaining claims also fail for failing to plead a sufficient factual basis.

First, Plaintiffs have not met the heightened pleading standard required to allege that the County committed election fraud. Under CR 9(b), "[i]n *all averments of fraud* or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity" (emphasis added). It is not necessary under CR 9 "that the word 'fraud' be used in the complaint, as long as facts are pleaded sufficient to present the question of fraud." *Pedersen v. Bibioff*, 64 Wash. App. 710, 721, 828 P.2d 1113 (1992) (citing *Harstad v. Frol*, 41 Wn. App. 294, 301, 704 P.2d 638 (1985)). Here, Plaintiffs' entire Complaint is grounded in baseless and vague allegations of election fraud, and therefore, it must meet the heightened pleading standard under Washington law. *See* Compl. ¶ 15 (stating that Plaintiffs are "informed and believe" that the County tabulated election results on an "Uncertified Voting System"); ¶ 34 (accusing the

inspection by the canvassing board, or tabulation" and "may only be accessed in accordance with RCW 29A.60.110 and 29A.60.125."

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Director of engaging in "party preference" without any factual support for such allegation). This heightened pleading standing "requires that the pleading apprise the defendant of the facts that give rise to the allegation of fraud." *See Adams v. King Cnty.*, 164 Wn. 2d 640, 662, 192 P.3d 891 (2008) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs fail to allege any specific facts that give rise to the supposed fraud.

Plaintiffs only present conclusions and sweeping incantations of fraud—but without providing any supporting detail, much less claims that would satisfy their burden under CR 9(b) of pleading with particularity. See, e.g., Lutaaya v. Boeing Emps. Credit Union, 5 Wn.App.2d 1022, 2018 WL 4583679, at \*4 (2018) (plaintiff "made only vague allegations of fraud" and therefore did not meet the heightened pleading standard); McAfee v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 193 Wn. App. 220, 232–33, 370 P.3d 25 (2016) ("McAfee makes general statements about the defendants' 'collusion,' 'material misrepresentations,' and 'fraudulent actions.' But 'these conclusory assertions and general complaints do not provide the who, what, when, where, and how of a properly pleaded fraud claim.'"). Here, for example, Plaintiffs assert (without any further explanation or support) that the County Director or other election officials "added" 400,000 votes, "flipped" 6,000 votes, and "removed" thousands of voters in "one or more statewide races before, during, and/or after the election." Compl. ¶ 26. But they offer nothing to explain the who, what, when, or why of these groundless accusations. These are precisely the types of vague allegations of fraud that do not meet the heightened pleading standard of CR 9(b).

Second, Plaintiffs fail even to meet even the lesser pleadings standards under CR 8(a). Under CR 8(a), a complaint need contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and "a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." *FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt.*, *Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc.*,

175 Wn. App. 840, 865–66, 309 P.3d 555 (2013) (citations omitted). But "[a] pleading is insufficient when it does not give the opposing party fair notice of what the claim is and the ground upon which it rests." *Id.* (citing *Kirby v. City of Tacoma*, 124 Wn. App. 454, 470, 98 P.3d 827 (2004)). Plaintiffs provide no clue as to what grounds their claims rest upon, nor do they provide any support for their claims beyond their own "information and belief." This requires Defendants to shadowbox in order to mount their defense, guessing what the grounds for Plaintiffs' claims *might be*. Plaintiffs' claims therefore fall far short of meeting even the minimal pleading standard of CR 8(a).

Plaintiffs' claims are nothing more than another in a long line of cases that have asserted baseless allegations of widespread election fraud. This conspiracy-theory has been repeatedly and emphatically found to be without merit,<sup>20</sup> and Intervenors are not aware of a single case where a court credited these allegations. This Court should not either.

#### VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Intervenor Washington State Democratic Central Committee respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> E.g., Trump v. Kemp, 511 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1331–34 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (dismissing challenge to 2020 election due to "illegal votes" for lack of standing and failure to state a claim); Trump v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 983 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1516 (2021) (affirming dismissal of election contest based on voter fraud); Bowyer, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 724 ("Allegations that find favor in the public sphere of gossip and innuendo cannot be a substitute for earnest pleadings . . . They most certainly cannot be the basis for upending Arizona's 2020 General Election."); Law v. Whitmer, 477 P.3d 1124, 2020 WL 7240299, at \*21 (Nev. 2020) ("The Contestants failed to meet their burden to provide credible and relevant evidence . . . to contest the [2020 Election]."); Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, 493 F. Supp. 3d 331, 394 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (dismissing challenge to 2020 election results based on "speculative evidence of voter fraud"); Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 1331 (dismissing lawsuit seeking to prevent Georgia's certification of the votes and noting that plaintiff presented "insubstantial evidence"); Kraus v. Cegavske, No. 82018, 2020 WL 6483971, at \*1 (Nev. Nov. 3, 2020) (upholding dismissal of lawsuit seeking to halt counting ballots based on claims of voter fraud because it "lacked evidentiary support").

Dated: March 30, 2023

I certify that this memorandum contains 8,267 words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.

#### s/ Kevin J. Hamilton

Kevin J. Hamilton, WSBA No. 15648 Amanda J. Beane, WSBA No. 33070 Reina A. Almon-Griffin, WSBA No. 54651 **Perkins Coie LLP** 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Telephone 206.359.8000 Facsimile 206.359.9000 KHamilton@perkinscoie.com

ABeane@perkinscoie.com RAlmon-Griffin@perkinscoie.com

Attorneys for WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

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# EXHIBIT D



SPOKANE COUNTY COURT HOUSE

### Superior Court of the State of Washington For the County of Spokane

Department No.

5

# Michael P. Price Judge

1116 WEST BROADWAY • SPOKANE, WA 99260-0350 (509) 477-4766 • FAX (509) 477-5714 dept5@spokanecounty.org

February 14, 2022

Ms. Amanda Beane Perkins Coie LLP 1201 3<sup>rd</sup> Ave Ste 4900 Seattle, WA, 98101-3099 Ms. Virginia Shogren Attorney at Law 961 W Oak Ct Sequim, WA, 98382-3069 Mr. Paul Triesch Keating, Bucklin & McCormack Inc, PS 801 2<sup>nd</sup> Ave, Ste 1210 Seattle, WA, 98104-1518

## WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED et al vs. SCHUMACHER, CHANDRA et al Lincoln County No. 21-2-00042-22

Dear Counsel.

As you will recall, I was unable to provide a decision at the time of our hearing on February 17, 2022 given limited time on my schedule.

Having now had the opportunity to consider this matter fully, please find enclosed an Order entered in this matter today with the Lincoln County Clerk's Office.

As always, I appreciate Counsel's continued assistance and professionalism.

Very truly yours,

Michael P. Price Superior Court Judge

mpp/cea

CC: Lincoln County Court File

Enclosure: Order

#### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR LINCOLN COUNTY

WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a Washington State Nonprofit Corporation; JERRY SCHULZ,

Plaintiffs.

v.

CHANDRA SCHUMACHER, Lincoln County Auditor; LINCOLN COUNTY, and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

Defendants,

and

WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

Proposed Intervenor Defendant.

00042-22 No. 21-2<del>-01775-06</del>

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE

Before the Court is Proposed Intervenor Defendant Washington State Democratic Central Committee's ("WSDCC") Motion to Intervene. Having reviewed the papers filed in

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE – 1

Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000

support of and in opposition to (if any) this Motion, and being fully advised, the Court finds that WDSCC has satisfied the elements of intervention as of right and the elements of permissive intervention. Accordingly, WSDCC is entitled to intervene in this case, and the Court GRANTS WSDCC's motion and instructs WSDCC to file a response to the Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

2-14-2022

SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE

Perkins Coie LLP

#### Prepared by:

### s/ Kevin J. Hamilton

Facsimile 206.359.9000

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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE – 3

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# EXHIBIT E

The Honorable Michael Price 1 Noted For: March 25, 2022 at 11:00 AM With Oral Argument 2 COPY 3 Original Filed MAR 28 2022 4 TIMOTHY W. FITZGERALD 5 SPOKANE COUNTY CLERK 6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 8 No. 212-00042 22 WASHINGTON ELECTION 9 INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' Washington State Nonprofit 10 Corporation; JERRY SCHULZ, MOTION TO DISMISS 11 Plaintiffs, [PROPOSED] 12 v. 13 CHANDRA SCHUMACHER, Lincoln County Auditor; LINCOLN COUNTY, 14 and DOES 1-30, inclusive, 15 Defendants, 16 and 17 WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 18 Intervenor Defendant. 19 20 THIS MATTER came before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court 21 considered Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the records and files herein, including: 22 1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; 23 2. Documents cited therein subject to judicial notice; 24 3. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; 25 4. Intervenor-Defendant Washington State Democratic Central Committee's Response 26 to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (if any); 27

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 212-00042 22 1476-00006/572095 KEATING, BUCKLIN & MCCORMACK, INC., P.S.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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PHONE: (206) 623-8861
FAX: (206) 223-9423

5. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; and

Drivern

The court also heard argument of counsel and was fully advised. WHEREFORE,

THE COURT FINDS that Plaintiffs' election claims are untimely and barred by statute and the equitable doctrine of laches, that the respective Plaintiffs each lack standing to bring the election claims alleged, and that Plaintiffs fail to state an election claim upon which relief may be granted. The court further finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Public Records Act.

THE COURT FINDS that Plaintiffs' claims are frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, are not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, and were interposed for improper purposes. WHEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and that Defendants shall be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred herein, pursuant to RCW 4.84.185, RCW 29A.68.060, and CR 11.

Done in open court this 38 day of March 2022.

Defendants shan file and serve an ernex fees and costs in curred in Judge Michael Price, Superior Court Judge

Presented by:

KEATING, BUCKLIN & McCORMACK, INC., P.S.

Paul J. Triesch, WSBA #17445 Attorneys for Defendants

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212-00042 22

KEATING, BUCKLIN & MCCORMACK, INC., P.S. ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 1210 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104 PHONE: (206) 623-8861 FAX: (206) 223-9423

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1	1 Approved as to form; Notice of presentation waived:			
2	2 VIRGINIA P. SHOGREN, P.C			
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4	11 20 7 10			
5	Virginia P. Shogren, WSBA #33939 Attorney for Plaintiff WEICU			
6	6			
7	1123.			
8	8 Jerry Schulz, Plaintiff Pro Se			
9	9 PERKINS COIE LLP			
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11	II			
12	IXCVIII J. 114IIIIIIIIIIII W SDA #13046			
13	II Amanda I Baana WSDA #22070			
14	4 Nitika Arora, WSBA #54084 Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant			
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# EXHIBIT F

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The Honorable Michael P. Price

## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a Washington State Nonprofit Corporation; JERRY SCHULZ,

No. 212-00042 22

JUDGMENT

(RCW 4.64.030)

Plaintiffs,

V.

CHANDRA SCHUMACHER, Lincoln County Auditor; LINCOLN COUNTY, and DOES 1-30, inclusive,

Defendants.

Judgment Summary (RC

Judgment Creditors: Chandra Schumacher and Lincoln County

Judgment Creditors' Attorney: Paul J. Triesch

20 | Judgment Debtors: Washington Election Integrity Coalition United

and Jerry Schulz, pro se, jointly and severally

Judgment Debtor WEICU's Attorney: Virginia P. Shogren

Awarded Costs: \$849.81

Awarded Attorney Fees: \$21,736.50

On March 25, 2022, the above cause came before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to CR 12, Rules for Superior Court. Plaintiff Washington

JUDGMENT - 1 212-00042 22 1476-00006/576456

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JUDGMENT - 2 212-00042 22 1476-00006/576456

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#### PERKINS COIE LLP

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Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant

Nitika Arora, WSBA #54084

Amanda J. Beane, WSBA #33070 Reina A. Almon-Griffin, WSBA #54651

By:

JUDGMENT - 3 212-00042 22 1476-00006/576456

KEATING, BUCKLIN & MCCORMACK, INC., P.S.

ATTORNE'S AT LAW

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SEATILE, WASHINGTON 98104
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### DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on April 6, 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties listed below via the method indicated:

## Attorneys for Plaintiff Washington Election Integrity Coalition United

Virginia P. Shogren Virginia P. Shogren, P.C. 961 W. Oak Court Sequim, WA 98382

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### Attorneys for Plaintiff (Pro Se)

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### Attorneys for Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor Washington State Democratic Central Committee

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DATED this 6th day of April, 2022, at Seattle, Washington.

Lindsey Martin, Legal Assistant

JUDGMENT - 4 212-00042 22 1476-00006/576456

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# EXHIBIT G

### **ORIGINAL FILED**

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MICHAEL J. KILLIAN FRANKLIN COUNTY CLERK X41

#### SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

WASHINGTON ELECTION INTEGRITY COALITION UNITED, a Washington State Nonprofit Corporation, ETHAN CARLSON, and FRED CARPENTER,

Plaintiffs.

v.

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MATTHEW BEATON, Franklin County Auditor, FRANKLIN COUNTY, and DOES 1-30, inclusive

Defendants.

Case No. 21-2-50572-11

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RULE 12(b)(6) AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLEADINGS UNDER CIVIL RULE 11(a)

[PROPOSED]

Cx M

Having considered Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Under Civil Rile 12(b)(6) and Motion to Strike Pleadings Under Civil Rule 11(a), and the papers and pleadings on file, the Court finds that, for the reasons stated in Defendants' Motion, Plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alternatively, and independently of Plaintiffs' lack of standing and failure to state a valid claim, the Complaint is invalid on behalf of Plaintiff Washington Election Integrity Coalition United for lack of proper attorney signature.

Thus, it is hereby ORDERED that:

- 1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
- 2. Defendant's Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RULES 12(b)(6) AND 11(a)- 1 LANE POWELL PC 1420 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 4200 P.O. BOX 91302 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98111-9402 206.223.7000 FAX: 206.223.7107

1	DATED this 13 day of Delum	w, 2021.
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4		The Honorable
5	Presented by:	CAMERON MITCHELL
6	LANE POWELL PC	
7	0, $0$ , $0$	
8	By: Caluid Casulle	
9	Callie A. Castillo, WSBA No. 38214	
10	castilloc@lanepowell.com Telephone: 206.223.7000 Facsimile: 206.223.7107	
11	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RULES 12(b)(6) AND 11(a)- 2

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